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FORCINGS 
 
Lee Anne Fennell* 
 
Eminent domain receives enormous amounts of scholarly and popular 
attention, and for good reason—it is a powerful form of government 
coercion that cuts to the heart of ownership. But a mirror-image form of 
government coercion has been almost entirely ignored: forced ownership, 
or “forcings.” While legal compulsion to begin or continue ownership is 
neither entirely unstudied as an academic matter nor entirely 
unprecedented as a doctrinal matter, the category lacks a unified treatment. 
Because coercively imposed ownership can substitute for other forms of 
government coercion, forcings deserve attention, even if they will rarely 
dominate other alternatives. Attending to forcings as a conceptual 
possibility reveals their kinship with existing features of law and highlights 
one of ownership’s most essential moves: delivering actual outcomes, and 
not just their expected value equivalents. Unpacking the considerations that 
might prompt law to impose ownership on unwilling parties points the way 
to alternatives short of full-strength compelled ownership. The analysis also 
suggests an additional domain of government action—“relievings”—for  
unburdening owners of unwanted property. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Takings, or involuntary terminations of ownership, have a widely 
ignored logical counterpart: involuntary impositions of ownership, or 
“forcings.”  Although legal doctrines of long standing sometimes compel 
people to own or to continue owning property,1 the phenomenon of 
compelled ownership remains undertheorized. This paper takes on this 
neglected conceptual category. Attending to forcings generates important 
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comments and conversations on earlier drafts.  I also thank Kristin Czubkowski for excellent research assistance 
and the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan Faculty Fund for financial support.     
1 See infra Part I.A. 
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theoretical and policy payoffs, including the possibility that compelled 
ownership could substitute for or augment other forms of government 
coercion such as eminent domain.     
Consider blighted urban properties that have been vacated by defaulting 
owners and neglected by mortgagees.  Eminent domain designed to keep 
owners in possession is the hot button strategy de jour for cities like 
Richmond, California.2  But the ends of local governments facing the risk of 
foreclosure blight might also be achieved by requiring someone—perhaps 
the lender, perhaps a party developing an adjacent parcel—to  step up to the 
plate of ownership when the owner in possession decamps.  More broadly, 
some of the land assemblies currently pursued through eminent domain 
might instead be created by requiring existing owners to expand their 
holdings if they wish to stay in place.  Forced ownership might also be used 
remedially, or as a form of prospective land use control, to compel owners 
to absorb responsibility for the areas that they impact. 
The idea of pressing ownership on an unwilling party might seem like 
an obvious non-starter for at least two reasons.  First, one might think that 
an unwilling owner will necessarily be a low-valuing owner, and hence an 
objectively bad owner. If the point of property is to get resources into the 
hands of the highest valuing user, forcings might seem to push in exactly 
the wrong direction. Second, the interference with personal autonomy 
associated with forced ownership might seem so great as to make forcings a 
normatively toxic idea, as well as a political impossibility.  The reactions to 
the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act (as well as to the more 
ominous prospect of forced broccoli purchases) suggest intense popular 
resistance to forced acquisitions of unwanted things.3   
These points are undermined by the fact that the law already imposes 
several forms of forced ownership, from remedies for conversion and 
accession to limits on abandonment. Far from being alien or unprecedented, 
doctrines that produce and sustain unwanted ownership are threaded 
throughout the law.  Of course, ownership is rarely foisted on parties out of 
the blue; rather, it is bundled with some earlier act or omission—often, an 
earlier choice to undertake some form of voluntary ownership. These 
observations lead to two lines of inquiry that are pursued here. First, what 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Shila Dwan, A City Invokes Seizure Laws to Save Homes, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2013 (reporting 
on Richmond’s plan to use eminent domain to seize underwater mortgages in order to provide loans with new 
terms to homeowners); Robert Rogers, Both Sides in Richmond Eminent Domain Plan Set for Showdown at City 
Council Meeting, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013 (reporting on controversy surrounding the plan, which has 
already attracted litigation).    
3 See Supreme Court of the United States, Oral Argument Transcript, Department of Health and Human 
Services v. Florida, March 27, 2012, at 13  (Scalia, J.) (asking whether the reasoning supporting the required 
purchase of health insurance would also justify the forced purchase of broccoli) 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf; see also James B. 
Stewart, How Broccoli Landed on Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012 (reporting on Justice Scalia’s 
question and tracing the roots of the analogy). 
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considerations would prompt the law to impose ownership, as opposed to a 
monetary obligation, on an unwilling party? Second, what normative 
justifications and limits govern the bundling of ownership obligations with 
earlier choices?     
Examining existing forms of forced ownership directs attention to one 
of property’s most essential moves: providing a vehicle for delivering actual 
outcomes rather than their expected value equivalents. This core feature of 
the ownership strategy has implications for information costs, risk 
allocation, and incentive alignment. Social benefits thus may be uniquely 
achieved through ownership itself.  Although these benefits can usually be 
realized by encouraging willing ownership, such inducements may be 
insufficient where a given party occupies a monopoly position with respect 
to a strongly complementary resource or property interest.   
The fact that forced ownership can advance social goals does not, of 
course, complete the case for it.  As with takings, forcings can selectively 
impose burdens that should in fairness be spread across society.4 And, as 
with takings, baseline questions quickly emerge when assessing the sorts of 
uncompensated burdens that individuals should be made to bear. That 
compensation could be used in tandem with forcings raises interesting 
untapped possibilities even as it introduces questions about the adequacy 
(and indeed commensurability) of compensation that mirror those found in 
the takings arena.   
Interestingly, recognizing the category of forcings suggests an 
additional domain for governmental action, which I term “relievings.”  As 
the name suggests, this move would involve the government removing 
burdensome and unwanted ownership from an erstwhile owner and either 
retaining ownership itself or imposing ownership on a third party.  Those 
who find forcings to be normatively objectionable should be particularly 
interested in relievings, because the failure to engage in relieving often 
effectively produces a type of forcing—forced retention.  Consider again 
defaulting mortgagors who have vacated the premises and wish to 
relinquish ownership, but cannot legally do so.  The relevant policy 
question is not whether the government should force someone to own the 
property in question, but rather who it shall force to take on that role.   
The analysis here connects to several bodies of prior literature.  Forced 
acquisition equates to the exercise of a put option, a move that has received 
attention in the literature on entitlement configuration.5 The compelled 
                                                 
4 Cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
5 In finance, a put option gives the holder the right but not the obligation to force a purchase of a specified 
item on the option-writing party at a specified price. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 503–05 (10th ed. 2011). Scholars have recognized that legal rules could 
operate in an analogous manner.  See, e.g., IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW (2005); Ian Ayres, Protecting Property 
with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 810 (1998); Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. 
REV. 822, 854-56 (1993).  
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continuation of ownership has been examined in the context of legal limits 
on abandonment6 and destruction.7 Weaker forms of pressure to begin or 
continue ownership can be found in many other legal features that have 
received academic treatment, from limits on free alienability to legal 
requirements that owners accept certain property bundles on an all-or-
nothing basis.8  Finally, forcings bear a family resemblance to givings, 
which have been previously analyzed as a counterpoint to takings.9  This 
paper draws on these disparate strands to provide a unified treatment of a 
topic that has received surprisingly little attention: the use (and misuse) of 
governmentally compelled ownership of real and personal property.   
The analysis proceeds in four Parts. Part I examines existing instances 
of unwanted ownership, broadly construed. Part II traces possible rationales 
for requiring parties to begin or continue ownership. Central to this 
discussion is an understanding of why ownership that is viewed as 
individually undesirable might nonetheless be viewed as socially desirable. 
Part III charts where forcings fit into a broader understanding of property 
ownership and state power. Part IV suggests ways in which compulsory 
ownership could be extended, as well as circumstances in which it might be 
refined or replaced with less coercive approaches or non-ownership 
alternatives.  
Before beginning, a few words about scope are in order. My focus here 
is on compelled ownership of real property and, to a lesser extent, personal 
property. Although forcings involving services and benefits also present 
important issues,10 my particular interest in this paper is on the way in 
which the ownership of physical things simultaneously empowers owners to 
manage inputs and exposes them to the risk of actual outcomes.11  Although 
parts of the discussion will reach nonpossessory land use rights, a principal 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Eduardo Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191 (2010); Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355 (2010).    
7 See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005). 
8 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1173-82 (1999) 
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1374 (1993); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, 
and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 15-16 (J. Roland Pennock & 
John W. Chapman eds., 1982); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931 (1985); Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (2009). 
9 Past work has considered the governmental conferral of benefits -- “givings” -- as the flip side of takings.  
See, e.g., WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (Donald G. Hagman & Dean 
J. Misczynski, eds., 1978); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001).   
However, because this work has focused on recapturing windfalls through the imposition of monetary charges 
rather than the offloading of unwanted property, it has not fully engaged with the concept of “forcings” as 
developed here.       
10 For example, restitution, although strictly limited in scope, can be understood within its operative domain 
as the forced purchase of benefits that have been conferred on unconsenting parties. See, e.g., Ariel Porat, Private 
Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2009) (discussing limits 
on restitution and proposing that the doctrine be expanded).  Insurance purchases are often compelled as well, 
either expressly or through law or policy.  More broadly, the government forces the purchase of various bundles 
of services through taxation.   
11 It is possible that some forms of intellectual property operate similarly, although I do not take up the 
question here.     
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distinction between this work and much of the previous literature on put 
options is the emphasis that I place on outcomes experienced over time by 
owners of possessory interests in property.12   
 
I.  UNWANTED OWNERSHIP 
 
Forcings involve ownership that is unwanted by the owner herself.  In 
this Part, I examine existing instances of unwanted ownership, broadly 
construed.  To be sure, many of the examples I discuss do not readily lend 
themselves to the label of “forced ownership”; the unwanted ownership 
interest follows (or is even generated by) some voluntary choice. This 
overinclusion is intentional.  My goal is not to demonstrate that the law is 
rife with ownership that is compelled in a strong sense, but rather that 
unwanted ownership is accepted and even embraced in many legal contexts.  
Establishing this point sets the stage for Part II’s inquiry into the purposes 
that might be served by ownership that is aversive to the owner herself.   
Section A presents a number of examples organized around the two 
basic ways in which unwanted ownership arises—through unwanted 
acquisition and through unwanted retention. Section B lays out the reasons 
that ownership might be aversive.  Section C distills lessons about the 
category of unwanted ownership and confronts a definitional  puzzle about 
its boundaries.   
 
A.  Existing Examples 
 
 How might people end up in unwanted relationships with property?  In 
a purely chronological sense, there are two possibilities: the person did not 
want to become an owner in the first place (“unwanted acquisition”) or she 
initially desired ownership but soured on it later (“unwanted retention”).  
 
1. Unwanted Acquisition 
 
Unwanted acquisition sometimes comes about through the direct 
imposition of a legal remedy, or through a contractual or statutory 
obligation that would enforce such a remedy. In other cases an unsought 
(but unrebuffed or unrebuffable) transfer from another party or a natural 
event produces a legally enforceable ownership obligation.  Other unwanted 
                                                 
12 Some work on put options has recognized forced purchases of possessory interests (as in trover, accession, 
and mistaken improver cases), but the analysis has focused primarily on private choices whether to transfer land 
use rights. For example, the potential role of put options in addressing nuisance claims has received attention in 
the entitlement literature. See, e.g., AYRES, supra note 5, at 29-38.  Like the call options to which they are framed 
as an alternative, the put options under discussion involve entitlements to make certain uses of property or the 
surrounding airspace, not full fee interests.    
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acquisitions come from bundling requirements that attach to desired 
property interests.   
 
Remedial, Statutory, and Contractual Acquisition.  Courts compel 
purchases remedially in a variety of circumstances. For example, courts will 
at times order specific performance against an unwilling buyer in a contract 
to purchase land.13 Trover, the compelled purchase of chattel property, is 
the traditional remedy for the tort of conversion.14 The shopkeeper’s 
warning, “You Break It, You Buy It,” may be understood as operating in 
the shadow of this remedial regime.  
In other instances, courts may prescribe a purchase as one of two (or 
more) remedial alternatives. For example, landowners who have suffered 
encroachments by innocent improvers may be given a choice between 
forcing a sale of the underlying land to the encroacher or purchasing the 
improvements.15 A landowner who has actively encouraged a mistaken 
improvement may be treated more harshly; in one case, such an owner was 
forced to purchase the house that had been built on his land.16  Principles of 
accession may similarly require forced purchases where a party has 
improved raw materials to create a new product: either the party who took 
the raw materials may be forced to purchase them, or the party who owned 
the raw materials may be required to purchase the improvements.17 
                                                 
13 More  commonly, specific performance of a real estate contract is imposed on an unwilling seller.  But 
courts have shown themselves willing to turn the tables and make the buyer go through with the deal too. See, 
e.g., Humphries v. Ables, 789 N.E.2d 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“The equitable doctrine is that the enforcement 
of contracts must be mutual, and, the vendee being entitled to specific performance, his vendor must likewise be 
permitted in equity to compel the acceptance of his deed and the payment of the stipulated consideration.”) 
(quoting Migatz v. Stieglitz, 166 Ind. 361, 77 N.E. 400 (1906)); Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, 783 
N.W.2d 294 (Wisc. 2010) (holding that specific performance was available to sellers of real estate, and declining 
to add a proviso that would require a finding of no adequate remedy at law). 
14 The plaintiff traditionally had a choice between trover, which forces a sale on the converter, and replevin, 
which involves recovering the property along with damages.  See AYRES, supra note 5, at 27. In modern times, the 
forced sale option may not be available where the converted item is returned relatively undamaged.  See RICHARD 
A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (10th ed. 2012).  
15 See, e.g., Hardy v. Borroughs 232 N.W. 200, 201 (Mich. 1930); see also Pull v. Barnes, 350 P.2d 828 
(Colo. 1960) (granting innocent improver the right to remove the cabin he had constructed, if feasible, or to place 
a lien on the land equal to the value of the cabin). The owner of the underlying land might instead be forced to sell 
to the encroacher.  See, e.g., Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E.2d 805 (Ct. App. W.Va. 1969); Mannillo v. Gorsky, 
255 A.2d 258, 264 (N.J. 1969).  Traditionally, encroached-upon owners could insist on injunctive relief (which 
might require the encroacher to tear down their structure) or request damages, effectively forcing a purchase of the 
encroached-upon land.  See Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895); AYRES, supra note 5, at 28.  Under modern law, 
a forced transfer is a more likely judicial response to a good faith improvement than injunctive relief, at least 
where the latter would impose a disproportionate hardship on the innocent encroacher.  See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET 
AL., PROPERTY 141 (7th ed. 2010).  For a discussion and analysis of different possible rules for addressing 
encroachments, see Matteo Rizzolli Building Encroachments, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 661 (2009). 
16 Ollig v. Eagles, 78 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Mich. 1956) (granting a lien upon the landowner’s property for “the 
reasonable value of the improvements [plaintiff] made to this land, excluding any contribution to the above made 
by [defendant’s] wife and by defendant, and set off by the reasonable rental value of the unimproved land which 
[plaintiff] used for the years he occupied it”).   
17 The general rule is that the owner of “the larger or more valuable input” gets to keep the thing in question.  
Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 466 (2009).   Various rules 
determine the compensation, if any, due to the other party, but one possible outcome is a forced purchase of the 
other party’s input. This may be accomplished through a lien on the property that contains the input.  See e.g., 
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The bounds of remedial ownership remain unclear, however, as a recent 
example illustrates. A couple in Upper Milford Township, Pennsylvania 
sued their neighbor, a registered sex offender who had pleaded guilty to an 
indecent assault on their young daughter, in an effort to force him to 
purchase their home.18 The forced purchase of a fee interest in real estate 
may be an unlikely remedy for the court to order in such a case.19  But the 
idea of countering land use conflicts with purchase demands is not 
unprecedented. Conditional variances in New Jersey offer neighboring 
landowners a choice between suffering the grant of the variance or making a 
binding offer to purchase the property for which the offending variance has 
been sought.20 The government is given a similar choice—stop regulating or 
pay up—when a landowner succeeds on an inverse condemnation suit.21   
Sometimes the law will force a swap of property for property, 
effectively compelling both a sale and a purchase. For example, judicial 
partition in kind simultaneously dispossesses the erstwhile co-tenant of a 
fractional undivided share in the whole property while forcibly conveying a 
full ownership interest in a portion of the property.22 Land readjustment 
schemes may operate similarly to deliver new land in place of old.23 In 
                                                                                                                            
Richard A. Epstein, Protecting Property with Legal Remedies: A Commonsense Reply to Professor Ayres,  32 
VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 851 (1998).   
18 See Patrick Lester, Family Sues to Force Sex Offender to Buy Its House, MORNING CALL, Mar. 16, 2013.  
The man had returned to the neighborhood after serving time in prison for the assault.  The couple claimed that 
the house had lost value as a result of his presence and that they felt under great pressure to move.  Id.   
19 Law professors contacted by the press about the case saw little chance that the court would grant the 
requested relief.  See id. (quoting Douglas Laycock for the idea that a forced home purchase might be part of a 
settlement but “would be odd as a court-ordered remedy”); id. (attributing to Anthony Sabino the view that the 
remedy might violate the 8th Amendment); Christina Ng, Family Sues to Force Sex Offender to Buy Its House, 
ABC.com, Mar. 20, 2013 (quoting Jamison Colburn regarding the “extraordinary nature of the relief they’re 
asking,” which he viewed as presenting “an uphill battle”).   
20 See, e.g., Nash v. Bd. of Adjustment, 474 A.2d 241, 246  (N.J. 1984) (holding that the offer must 
constitute the fair market value that the property would have if the variance were granted).  If such an offer is 
made, the owners of the property have the choice to sell at that price or keep the property without the variance.  
See id. at 245.  In other words, the owners who otherwise meet the criteria for a variance will receive either a 
variance or a put option with a strike price equal to the fair  market value of the property with the variance.    
21 Where a taking is found, the government may discontinue its regulation (and pay for the interim taking) or 
pay just compensation to acquire the property interest. The former situation amounts to a forced purchase of a 
time slice.  See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 
318–19 (1987).  A similarly structured choice was provided under the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic 
Area Act prior to its 1991 amendment.  Michael C. Blumm & Joshua D. Smith, Protecting the Columbia River 
Gorge: A Twenty-Year Experiment in Land-Use Federalism, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 201, 218-19 (2006) 
(examining the “opt-out” provision for Special Management Areas, which required the government to either 
accept a landowner’s bona fide offer to sell the property at fair market value or release the landowner from the 
regulations). 
22 Judicial partition operates coercively because it can be unilaterally sought over the objections of other co-
tenants.  While the co-tenants seeking partition in kind clearly desire the swap in question, the other co-tenants 
may not.   
23 Land readjustment is not well known in the United States but is used in many other countries.  It operates 
as a substitute for ordinary exercises of eminent domain.  Although specifics vary, the basic idea is to reconfigure 
a development area and return to the initial landowners property within that area that is at least as valuable as that 
which was taken from them, along with a share of the increase in value associated with the development. See e.g., 
ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION (Yu-Hung Hong & Barrie 
Needham, eds., 2007); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Can’t Buy Me Love: Monetary versus In-Kind Remedies, 2013 
U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 188; Frank Schnidman, Land Assembly by Assembling People, SP006 ALI-ABA 351 (2009); 
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these examples, an owner may primarily object to the initial deprivation, for 
which she does not feel the in-kind payment adequately compensates, rather 
than to the new grant of ownership. Nonetheless, forced compensation in 
kind via ownership may be objectionable in its own right, if only for the 
costs involved in liquidating or otherwise disposing of the interest.     
Contractual or statutory provisions may require a party to buy a product 
(or buy it back) if certain conditions occur.24 Recent examples include “put-
backs” of bad housing loans,25 and efforts to make mortgagees foreclose on 
properties that have been vacated by defaulting borrowers.26  Consider also 
provisions that turn library book borrowers or video renters into owners 
(with payment obligations) if they fail to return an item for a specified 
period of time, and policies or laws that allow retail products to be returned 
after their purchase, effectively forcing their repurchase. 27    
 
Unrebuffed and Unrebuffable Transfers. Some unwanted acquisitions 
arise through transfers from other parties that were not rebuffed in time, or 
perhaps could not have been successfully rebuffed at all. Gifts, bequests, 
and inheritances all require acceptance by the donee. Nonetheless, as long 
as the property is valuable, acceptance may be readily inferred.28 Because 
disclaiming ownership will often come at some positive cost, unrebuffed 
transfers can produce unwanted ownership. Factual disputes surrounding 
acceptance may erupt if ownership turns out to be a losing proposition, as 
where the owner is liable for significant environmental cleanup costs.29  
                                                                                                                            
George W. Liebmann, Land Readjustment for America: A Proposal for a Statute, 32 URB. L. 1 (2000). 
24 These put options may be explicit or they may be embedded in contractual or legal arrangements.  On 
embedded options, see, for example AYRES, supra note 5;  Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded 
Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM L. REV. 1428 (2004); George S. Geis, 
An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1664, 1686 n.114 (2006). 
25 See, e.g., Scott Suttell, Mortgage Giants Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Battle Banks on Who Gets Stuck with 
Bad Housing Loans, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUSINESS, blog entry of Oct. 4, 2012, 2:00 pm,  
http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20121004/BLOGS03/121009895 ;[Nick Timiraos, Burdened by Bad 
Loans, Banks Are Slow to Lend Now, WSJ., Oct. 4, 2012]. 
26 Mortgages in non-recourse jurisdictions have sometimes been viewed as granting a put option to sell one’s 
home back to the mortgagee at the price of the outstanding loan balance.  See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. 
Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2009).  The 
characterization is imperfect, however, to the extent that mortgagees can refuse to foreclose.  See infra note 23.  
Recent efforts to force foreclosure would transform what is now a call option for the mortgagee into a (true) put 
option held by the mortgagor.   
27 This is a common feature in retail sales; many refund provisions effectively grant the buyer a put option.  
Hyundai offered an interesting version of this option from early 2009 to early 2011:  car buyers who lost their jobs 
within one year of buying a Hyundai could sell it back, and Hyundai would cover any difference between the 
outstanding loan balance on the car and the car’s trade-in value. See Peter Valdes-Dapena, Hyundai Won’t Buy 
Your Car Back Anymore, CNNMoney, Mar. 30, 2011.   
28 See, e.g., Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 874–75 (N.Y. 1986) (“Acceptance by the donee is essential to 
the validity of an inter vivos gift, but when a gift is of value to the donee, as it is here, the law will presume an 
acceptance on his part.”). 
29 For example, acceptance was disputed in a case involving a dam site that turned out to require $40,000 in 
repairs mandated by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation.  Janian v. Barnes, 284 
A.D.2d 717 (N.Y. 2001) (finding that the defendant had not expressly rejected a quitclaim deed and was therefore 
the sole owner of the dam,  barring some other defense to the transfer).   
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Chattel property that is abandoned on one’s land by another party 
without permission presents a kind of transfer that may be especially hard to 
rebuff.30  Even though the initial dumping constitutes a trespass, once the 
goods (or bads) are in place, they become the problem of the owner of the 
premises. The theoretical ability to bring an action against the party who 
abandoned the chattels is unlikely to translate into a meaningful practical 
opportunity to force the removal of the goods. Self-help may be employed 
to eject the offending item but only to the extent that one can do so without 
trespassing on the property of someone else. Self-help may also be used to 
keep such offending objects away in the first place (through the use of high 
fences, posted guards, and so on) but at some positive cost.   
 
Natural Occurrences. Natural occurrences can also produce ownership 
relationships without any input on the part of the owner. The principle of 
accession operates in a number of contexts to assign new interests to 
holders of related interests.31 Thus, under the doctrine of ratione soli, wild 
animals killed or captured on the land of the owner become the landowner’s 
property.32 Accretion can deliver new increments of real estate to riparian 
owners.33 And the doctrine of increase gives ownership of newborn animals 
to the owner of the animal’s mother.34 These unsought acquisitions may 
often be welcome, but they could easily be aversive for particular owners.   
The potential burdens associated with such rules push questions about 
the termination of ownership to the forefront. In a 1909 Georgia case, for 
example, a court of appeals alluded to the law of increase in concluding that 
humane destruction of a “worthless” dog must be permitted:   
 
If it were the law that a person might not kill his own dog, 
the ownership of one of these animals, especially in case it 
were a bitch, would entail a considerable burden; for one 
who found himself possessed of a worthless cur bitch would 
be obliged to care for and support not only her, but also the 
‘heirs of her body’ and all her ‘lineal descendants,’ which he 
could not give away, even to the third and the fourth, yes 
even to the thirty-third and thirty-fourth, generation; for 
                                                 
30 A related situation involves the purchase of real estate that contains unwanted chattel property.  See text 
accompanying notes 60-61 infra.   
31 See generally Merrill supra note 17. 
32 As Merrill explains, ratione soli is a competing principle to first possession, and was historically more 
dominant in England than in the United States. See Merrill, supra note 17, at 470.  The difference matters only to 
the extent that private unenclosed lands are open to hunters, since exclusion rights would ensure that only the 
landowner (or those granted permission by her) could capture or kill animals on the land. Id.  Moreover, it would 
seem that even a first possession rule would permit a hunter to abandon a captured or killed animal, making it the 
property of the landowner. 
33 See id. at 465-66. 
34 Id. at 460.    
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under the statute cruelty may consist in neglect as well as in 
some overt act.35 
  
2. Unwanted Retention 
 
Owners may find themselves holding or using property beyond the point 
where it generates positive returns, and even after it begins to impose a 
burden.  
 
Limits on Terminating Possession.  Recent scholarship has explored the 
limits on owners’ ability to unilaterally end their possessory relationship 
with property through abandonment or destruction.36 Restrictions on 
alienability can also make getting rid of property more costly or difficult,37 
as can features of the property itself that render it less marketable.38 These 
limits are important to the category of unwanted ownership in two ways.  
First, even ownership that is initially fully voluntary can become aversive 
over time, making blocked channels for ending the relationship significant 
on their own in generating unwanted ownership. Second, the categories of 
unwanted acquisition discussed above would have little bite were it not for 
blockades to disposing of property cheaply thereafter.  
The general common law rule that fee interests in real estate cannot be 
abandoned has significant implications, as the recent housing crisis has 
shown.  Despite some efforts to force lenders to foreclose when mortgagors 
vacate the premises and cease paying, defaulting mortgagors may be forced 
to retain ownership and the obligations that follow from it—including 
liability for homeowner association dues.39 A sale of the property is often 
blocked by the fact that the mortgage balance far exceeds the likely sales 
price.  The inability of the homeowner to come up with the difference locks 
her into ownership, unless the lender either agrees to a short sale or 
                                                 
35 Miller v. State, 63 S.E. 571, 573 (Ga. App. 1909).    
36 Strahilevitz, supra note 6; Peñalver, supra note 6; Strahilevitz, supra note 7; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Unilateral Relinquishment of Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 125 
(Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith, eds., 2011); see also J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 79-80 
(1997). 
37 See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 8. 
38 See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 8, at 1427-28 & n. 118 (distinguishing legal restrictions on alienability from 
marketability constraints and discussing related literature). Ownership that is hard to end due to lack of 
marketability or other non-legal barriers is sometimes described as  “forced.”  See, e.g., Bernard Benjamin 
Hoffman, Jr., Forced Home Ownership (dissertation, Syracuse, 1967) (describing the situation of homeowners 
who wish to leave their present home but are unable to do so due to various factors). 
39 Mhari Saito, Banks Refusing to Take Back Foreclosed Properties, NPR, Mar. 3, 2009 (discussing the 
possibility of legislation “that would force lenders to completely follow through with foreclosure or forgive the 
homeowner’s debt”); John Gittelsohn,  Homeowner Associations in Need of Cash Sue to Force Foreclosures, 
Bloomberg.com, Aug. 23, 2011,  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-24/homeowner-associations-in-need-
of-cash-sue-lenders-to-force-foreclosures.html (discussing “mortgage terminator” lawsuits brought by homeowner 
associations against homeowners and lenders to collect unpaid association dues). Homeowner association dues 
were at issue in Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), a leading case 
holding that there is no right to abandon fee interests in real property.    
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forecloses on the property—and it may legally choose to do neither.40   
The ability to abandon chattel property is often also severely 
constrained.  Specific provisions restrict the ability to abandon certain kinds 
of chattel property, such as automobiles41 and animals.42 More broadly, 
there may be few legal options to discard chattels on the property of 
others.43  The simplest examples are bans on littering.  Although these 
prohibitions are usually enforced with fines rather than by forcing the owner 
to continue in possession, an interesting example of the latter approach can 
be found in one Spanish town’s approach to pet waste: mailing dog feces 
back to the errant owners.44   
 
Limits on Terminating Use.  Closely related to the unwanted retention of 
property is the forced continuation of the property’s current use. For 
example, rent control laws may effectively require that the property 
continue in rental use, especially if coupled with other limitations that 
preclude repossessing the property for personal use, converting it to any 
other use, or destroying it.45  Historic preservation ordinances prohibiting 
the destruction of improvements on property present a similar scenario.46  
Here, keeping the underlying parcel requires keeping the structure as well.  
While the entire property may be sold, the requirement that the use remain 
unchanged and that the new owner engage in upkeep of the property limits 
its marketability.    
                                                 
40 See, e.g.,  In re Cormier, 434 B.R. 222 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (finding “no authority under Massachusetts 
law or the Bankruptcy Code to compel American [the mortgagee] to take immediate title to or possession of the 
Property”).  Land banks offer a possible way out of the conundrum by offering lenders a low-cost way to dispose 
of the property, but may carry some drawbacks as well. See GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcomm. on Econ. 
Policy, Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Mortgage Foreclosures: Additional 
Mortgage Servicer Actions Could Help Reduce the Frequency and Impact of Abandoned Foreclosures (Nov. 
2010),  http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1193.pdf (examining the incidence of abandoned foreclosures and 
assessing possible solutions, including land banks).  
41 See, e.g., Conn. Code § 14-150 (making it illegal to leave a motor vehicle on the highway or on another 
person’s property for more than 24 hours).    
42 Animal protection laws vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  For one compilation, see 
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Animal Protection Laws of the United States and Canada,  
http://aldf.org/resources/advocating-for-animals/animal-protection-laws-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-
canada/.   
43 The fact that land cannot be legally abandoned means that the land of others must the site of a successful 
abandonment—yet the land of another cannot be legally used for this purpose either without their implicit or 
explicit consent.  See Peñalver, supra note 6, at 203-07.   
44 Suzanne Daley, Special Delivery, of Sorts, for Wayward Dog Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2013.      
45 This is the situation that was described in the petition for certiorari in Harmon v. Kimmel, a case that 
involved the application of New York’s rent stabilization laws to properties that were zoned only for residential 
use, that were landmarked and hence could not be destroyed, and that could not be reclaimed for family use unless 
a suitable alternative rental was provided to the tenants.  Cert. Petition at 32-35.  The Second Circuit rejected the 
Harmons’ claim that the laws worked a taking of their property, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.  See 
Harmon v. Markus, 412 Fed.Appx. 420 (2d Cir. 2011) cert. denied by Harmon v. Kimmel, 132 S. Ct. 1991 (2012). 
46 See Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975) cert. denied 426 U.S. 905 (1976) 
(prohibiting the destruction of a cottage adjacent to the landowner’s home in the historic French quarter, pursuant 
to an architectural control ordinance designed to preserve the “tout ensemble” of the quarter); see also  Carol M. 
Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 
507-08 (1981) (discussing the Maher case).   
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Land use exactions and in “in lieu of” fees may similarly pressure the 
continuation of existing uses.  The California case of Ehrlich v. City of 
Culver City offers an interesting example.47 There, the landowner had 
closed its unprofitable tennis club after a string of financial losses and 
sought approval for a new use.  The City conditioned approval on (among 
other things) the owner mitigating the loss of recreational opportunities in 
the community by constructing four new municipal tennis courts or paying 
a $280,000 fee.48 Although the court remanded for consideration of whether 
the fee was proportionate under the Dolan standard, it indicated that the 
withdrawal of recreational uses could impose public costs for which some 
impact fee might be appropriate.49 
“Use it or lose it” requirements similarly constrain owners by mandating 
the active exercise of certain prerogatives of ownership.50 These 
requirements can be understood as limiting the (temporary) disposition of 
property51 and may thereby produce a type of unwanted ownership.    
Adverse possession imposes a similar, if weaker, requirement that 
ownership be accompanied by acts characteristic of ownership (use or 
monitoring), if one does not wish to risk dispossession.52  Here it is worth 
flagging an important conceptual point that I will revisit below: once we 
broaden the understanding of aversive ownership to encompass unwanted 
aspects of ownership or unwanted duties attending to ownership, it becomes 
difficult to bound the principle or to distinguish it from ownership more 
generally.  
 
B.  Reasons for Aversion 
 
Why might parties wish to avoid ownership?  There are several 
possibilities.  First, ownership might be unwanted because it comes with a 
                                                 
47 Ehrlich v. City of Culver City,  911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996).   
48 Id. at 434-35 
49 Id. at 446 (“In short, it is well accepted in both the case and statutory law that the discontinuance of a 
private land use can have a significant impact justifying a monetary exaction to alleviate it.”); see also id. at 448-
50 (discussing the standard of “rough proportionality” established by the Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1993), and remanding the case for further consideration under it).   
50 See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better than Less: An Exploration in Property 
Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 650–60, 681–83 (2008) (discussing “use or lose” provisions). Weaker penalties or 
subsidies might also be designed to pressure property use.  Recent examples include bills introduced by 
Philadelphia City Council President Darrell L. Clarke to address neglected properties.  See Troy Graham, Clarke 
Plans Bill on Vacant Properties, PHILA. INQ., June 8, 2013 (describing a bill that would impose a “non-utilization 
tax” of “10 percent of a property’s assessed value after it had been vacant for more than a year,” with increased 
taxes kicking in for additional years of vacancy); Jan Ransom, Council Bills Aim to Make Vacant, Tax-Delinquent 
Properties Profitable, Philly.com, Mar. 8, 2013 (describing a mortgage-forgiveness bill for residents below a 
certain income level “who build housing [and] live on the property for five years).   
51 See PENNER, supra note 36, at 79 (“[I]f we regard the idea that a right to exclusive use permits us to 
decide never to use an object of property again, then it must encompass the lesser decision to forego using it for a 
day or a month or a year.  Such a decision is as much a disposition of the property as is its total abandonment.”). 
52 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 
1122, 1130 (1985). 
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payment obligation that exceeds what the property is worth to the owner.  
Often, the owned item would be desirable if it could be obtained for free, 
but not if it must be paid for at the specified rate. This is usually the case 
when a put option is exercised to force a sale. The circumstances that cause 
the option to be “in the money” for the option holder are typically ones that 
also make the forced purchase a bad deal for the party against whom the 
option is exercised. What is aversive is the price, not the good.  Similarly, 
many remedial applications of forced ownership—such as being required to 
pay for land upon which one has innocently encroached—would not be 
aversive (nor remedial) if the transfer were completed for free.   
 Second, ownership might be unwanted because it comes with liability 
exposure.  Expected liability might outstrip the expected benefits that will 
flow from ownership, or exposure might simply present an unacceptable 
level of risk to the owner (even though ownership would on the whole 
present a positive expected value).53  It is most natural to think of this 
exposure in terms of liability to third parties—whether governmental 
entities who impose taxes or environmental clean-up obligations, collectives 
who demand residential association fees, or individuals who suffer harms 
while on one’s premises. But ownership may also expose the owner herself 
to uncompensated harms.54  These harms may range from small, certain, 
and chronic (the abiding ugliness of an unwanted gift,55 the constant upkeep 
requirements of a suboptimally large lawn) to large, uncertain, and acute 
(the chance of fatal exposure to dangerous property conditions). 
Third, ownership might be unwanted because it will require costly 
transfer or disposal efforts that exceed any value that the owner can realize 
as a result.56  Where practical barriers to transfer or disposal exist, legal 
limits need not be present to make ownership aversive if the property itself 
is unwanted or expected to become so. Some motivation must still be 
posited for the aversion to the property itself, however, to explain the desire 
to transfer or dispose of it. Often the notion of liability exposure, broadly 
construed, will provide the answer.  Ownership carries an opportunity cost, 
demanding time, space, attention, or effort that the owner might prefer to 
use in another way.  In other cases, a payment obligation associated with the 
forced purchase generates pressure to liquidate, either because that 
                                                 
53 The latter situation will be most likely where robust insurance markets do not exist, whether for adverse 
selection reasons or otherwise, or (what amounts to the same thing) where part of the risk takes a form that cannot 
be compensated with money (such as the guilt one would feel if a houseguest suffered an injury on one’s 
property).   
54 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 167 n.26 (1970) (using the term “liability” broadly to 
capture impacts that are left to fall on victims of accidents).   
55 See Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 366 (describing “tyrannical heirlooms”).   
56 Even where the owner expects to realize positive value from the disposition of the property, the ownership 
may still be unwanted relative to a monetary award to which one might otherwise be entitled and which one might 
prefer.  Here, the cost of disposal or transfer represents the cost of transforming the less preferred in-kind item 
into the preferred currency of cash.    
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obligation has caused a financial shortfall, or because the owner does not 
want to bear the investment risk associated with holding onto the property.   
Finally, ownership might be aversive for reasons relating to autonomy 
or personhood.  The things that one owns are in some sense an extension of 
the self and constitutive of one’s identity.57  Just as having one’s personally 
significant property wrested away can interfere with self-definition, so too 
can having unwanted things thrust upon one.58 Liability exposure is one 
reason that people might not wish to be personally associated with things.  
But the objection to ownership may go deeper, given the potential for 
people to identify with the things they own and hence with the harms that 
they inflict.59 Property holdings can also clash with one’s sense of self.  
Consider, for example, a property owner in the American South who 
discovers upon clearing her rural tract that it contains an abandoned bus 
from the mid-20th century marked with segregated seating instructions.60 
This difficult-to-remove bus may become a source of shame to the 
landowner, who wants no association with its racist message.61  
 
C.  Taking Stock 
 
This brief tour of existing forms of unwanted ownership has established 
that the phenomenon exists:  sometimes people do not want the things they 
own. Their reasons may be idiosyncratic or personal and will not 
necessarily track the asset’s net present value.  The discussion above has 
also established that the law not only tolerates the existence of unwanted 
ownership, but also actively produces it through a variety of doctrines.  
However, the pattern of examples suggests that certain features tend to 
accompany  unwanted ownership as it exists on the ground.  Taking note of 
these features will help to develop the basis and limits of forced ownership.   
First, ownership is rarely forced in a full and permanent sense, insofar 
                                                 
57 See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, The Value of Ownership, 9 J. POLIT. PHIL. 404 (2001) (examining 
connections between ownership and identity). 
58 See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 36, at 79 (“One ought not to be saddled with a relationship to a thing that 
one does not want . . . .”); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 602 (noting the interference with autonomy 
inherent in a forced purchase). 
59 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959, 979-81 
(1992) (explore the relationship between property and the self using an example in which one’s vase blows out the 
window through no fault of one’s own and falls on a passerby).   
60  See Jodi A. Barnes & Carl Steen, Archaeology and Heritage of the Gullah People: A Call to Action, 1 J. 
AFRICAN DIASPORA ARCHAEOLOGY & HERITAGE 167, 201 fig. 11 (2012) (photograph showing a segregated 
seating notice inside a bus abandoned on rural property near Edgefield, South Carolina). 
61 The effects of repugnant things may linger even after they are physically removed.  A powerful example is 
related in Paul Auster’s memoir.  He describes moving into a house and discovering some boxes of books that had 
been left behind by the previous owners.  To his disgust, he finds that the collection includes pro-Nazi tracts and a 
volume defending anti-Semitism.  He hauls the books to the town dump, but their taint remains, ultimately forcing 
him to move out.  As he explains, addressing his former self: “It wasn’t possible to live in a house with such 
books in it. . . . but even after you had got rid of the books, it still wasn’t possible to live there.  You tried, but it 
simply wasn’t possible.”  PAUL AUSTER, A WINTER’S JOURNAL (2012).   
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as it is usually possible to avoid it by incurring some cost or paying some 
penalty. Even if the law purports to force ownership without any escape 
hatch, compelled possession is more difficult and unusual to enforce 
injunctively than compelled nonpossession. This asymmetry makes it likely 
that only financial responsibility would follow from shirking the duties of 
ownership.62  Ownership avoidance opportunities, whether de jure or de 
facto, are significant. They may help to mitigate the costs to unwilling 
owners of unwanted ownership, but they may also reduce the benefits that 
society can realize through such (attempted) compulsion.  
Second, unwanted ownership typically follows some earlier, identifiable 
choice (often, the choice to enter into some desired ownership relationship). 
This makes it possible to recast unwanted ownership as a wanted ownership 
bundle that merely contains some aversive elements—as ownership 
generally does. Limits on abandonment offer a clear example. By becoming 
an owner of real property in the first instance, one has effectively signed up 
to remain an owner until one can find someone else to accept the job; 
ownership today is bundled with ownership tomorrow. Ownership that 
begins involuntarily can also be characterized as a bundled choice, insofar 
as the ownership obligation is tied to some earlier decision that might be 
characterized as voluntary, whether to obtain some other ownership interest 
(such as the mother of the animal one now owns against one’s will), or to 
engage in some act or omission for which ownership follows remedially or 
by operation of law.  
These observations make it hard to pin down when we are dealing with 
a case of involuntary ownership, as opposed to just ownership.   Consider 
the law of increase, which makes the offspring of one’s female animals 
one’s own. If circumstances exist in which an owner, Owen, would prefer 
not to be the owner of a newborn calf recently born to his cow Bossy, can 
we say that the law has forced ownership of the calf on Owen?   
On one account, yes: the ownership came unbidden and is (by  
hypothesis) aversive.  On another, though, we might point out that Owen 
voluntarily acquired Bossy (or perhaps voluntarily acquired Bossy’s 
mother) and that one of the incidents of owning Bossy is owning Bossy’s 
offspring. Owning Bossy’s calf may be an aversive thread within the 
voluntary ownership of Bossy, but is it any different from being forced to 
buy food for Bossy, or “owning” the results of damage that Bossy causes if 
she strays onto someone else’s property?  Is Owen forced to be an owner 
                                                 
62 The informal “abandonment” of real property by a judgment-proof owner may be understood in this way, 
even though true abandonment is a legal impossibility. Similar points have been made in critiquing the 
distinctions among property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules pioneered in Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1089 (1972).  See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the 
Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837, 852-53 (1997) (observing that these “rules” governing transfers of entitlements 
may be broken).   
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(of the calf), or is Owen just forced to accept the responsibilities that 
naturally go with ownership (of Bossy)?63   
There is no obvious answer without resort to external principles about 
what ownership should entail.  Property mavens will notice that this inquiry 
is the flip side of the baseline problem that emerges in regulatory takings 
contexts: when owner Olive is prohibited from expanding her cottage, 
which is located on wetlands, has something been “taken” from her, or is 
the law instead merely recognizing the inherent limits on her title?64  The 
questions quickly devolve into normative ones. Because it is always 
possible to trace the imposition of an unwanted element of ownership to 
some prior voluntary act, the question becomes one of which coercive 
linkages or bundlings should be forbidden, permitted, or required.    
I will return to this issue of bundling below.  For now, an observation 
suffices:  It is no accident that the existing examples of unwanted ownership 
tend to involve relatively tight causal connections between earlier choices 
and later ownership obligations.  Without a theory of forcings to rely on—
one that might include the prospect of compensation—ownership is unlikely 
to be imposed except in instances where the associated burdens appear 
normatively justified.  These are likely to also be circumstances in which 
the resulting ownership bundles appear coherent.   
 
II.  WHY FORCE OWNERSHIP? 
 
Why would the law ever force an individual to start or maintain an 
ownership relationship that the individual herself did not find desirable?  At 
first blush, the question has an obvious answer.  If ownership makes a party 
responsible for making payments, accepting liability, or bearing the costs of 
disposal or transfer, it might seem self-evident why there would be a social 
interest in imposing it over the owner’s wishes.  But on closer inspection, 
the choice of mandating ownership requires more exploration.  I start with 
some observations about the “ownership strategy” and how its 
consequences vary from those produced by a system of damage payments. I 
will then turn to some reasons why society might prefer to impose 
                                                 
63 In other words, where are the natural or logical seams in ownership located?  Eduardo Peñalver explores 
one aspect of this question in observing that one can unilaterally abandon the benefit (only) of a servitude on land, 
since this does not mean walking away from obligations one has taken on.   Peñalver, supra note 6, at 212.  He 
continues, contrasting the case of fee ownership for which no abandonment is available:  “When ownership is 
conceived of as a social practice permeated by obligation, all property labors under a sort of servitude for the 
benefit of the communities in which the property is situated. . . . And, just as the owners of servient estates cannot 
unilaterally walk away from the obligations imposed by servitudes, the unilateral abandonment of property, 
especially land, is equally problematic.”  Id. at 213.  This analysis suggests that ownership is an undivided and 
eternal whole that cannot be temporally broken at a point of the owner’s (unilateral) choosing.  Rather, the owner 
must make an appropriate deal with some third party to accept the associated burdens.  Yet this still does not 
determine the content of those burdens—for that, we need to resort to some external normative theory.   
64 Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 612-14 (discussing baseline issues in charging for givings as 
well as paying for takings).   
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ownership.      
 
A.  The Ownership Strategy 
 
Henry Smith has helpfully focused attention on the “exclusion strategy” 
that property rights typically employ.65 Boundary exclusion creates a 
protected realm in which an owner can access resources free of outside 
invasion, and within which she can use self-help to keep her own impacts 
inside and those of others outside.66 The exclusion strategy works in tandem 
with governance strategies that help to protect the outside world from the 
activities of the property owner, and vice versa.67  For example, property’s 
exclusion strategy allows a factory owner to place a ring fence around the 
plant to protect widgets from being spirited away, while the complementary 
governance strategy imposes liability for pollution that spills over the 
property line.68   
This influential picture of property is useful but incomplete.   
Ownership also, and crucially, involves a certain allocation of risk.69 To 
own something is to bear outcomes—outcomes that may be influenced only 
probabilistically through one’s own inputs.70 Exclusion backed by 
governance constructs and controls the environment in which inputs are 
made and outcomes are realized and contained.  But risk remains.  As a 
result, owning outcomes is a very different thing than being directly 
assigned expected outcomes. The difference usually goes unnoticed because 
owners self-select into property ownership when they find the risks worth 
bearing and leave ownership when this is no longer the case.  With freely 
alienable and marketable property that is protected by property rules, an 
owner can choose at any time whether to select actual outcomes (become or 
                                                 
65 Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1755-57 (2004).   
66 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 
1012 (2004); Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1446 (2007).   
67 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) 
68 More recently, Thomas Merrill has outlined “the property strategy,” which focuses on “the nature of the 
prerogatives given to those called owners.”  Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 
2066 (2012).   
69 To be an owner is to be the residual claimant on whatever aspects of a resource have not been parceled out 
to others. This role should be assigned based on the ability to control those sources of variance. See YORAM 
BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 78 (2d ed. 1997) (“A party is expected to assume more of 
the variability, that is, become more of a residual claimant as its effect on the mean outcome increases.”).  
However, given imperfect insurance markets, there will typically remain additional sources of variance that are 
not under the owner’s control but that nonetheless influence the outcomes she will experience.    
70 Smith recognizes the significance to property ownership of the ability to place and collect on bets.  Henry 
E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 984 (2004); Henry E. Smith, 
Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1729 (2004). But because his discussion assumes that the 
bets are voluntarily undertaken, it does not address the possibility that ownership could create aversive risk 
arrangements.  Likewise, Merrill’s explication of “the property strategy” recognizes the incentive effects that 
accompany making the owner the residual claimant, but devotes little space to downside risk exposure. See 
Merrill, supra note 68, at 2092-93 (suggesting that insurance and social safety nets largely address concerns about 
risk).  
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remain an owner) or expected outcomes (cash out now).  
There are two situations where the difference between expected 
outcomes and actual outcomes is starkly presented.  One is when ownership 
is terminated involuntarily, as through eminent domain.  The other is when 
ownership is forced.  In the former situation, one loses the right to try one’s 
hand at getting actual outcomes that exceed expected outcomes—although 
one may also be saved from the risk of getting actual outcomes that are 
lower than expected outcomes.71  Forced ownership effectuates a different 
swap: one is made to bear actual outcomes, rather than simply being 
charged with expected outcomes. It is a different thing to pay damages 
(even “permanent damages” designed to cover projected future impacts) 
than it is to be exposed to ongoing liability. The two situations present 
different risk profiles and incentive structures.  
It is easier to grasp what the ownership strategy does by examining its 
metaphorical application to a different area of law—tort.  Arthur Ripstein 
has developed a concept of “risk ownership” that makes people owners (in 
some sense) of the risks they create by acting in the world.72  On this view, 
actors are properly saddled with (some) actual outcomes that flow from 
their behavior, not the expected value of the risks they generate.  This, after 
all, is what it means to be an owner.    
The bite of this approach can be seen in its application to the problem of 
“moral luck.”73 A moral luck conundrum arises when identical inputs 
(equally inattentive driving, say, or leaving a baby unattended in a bathtub 
for an equal amount of time) produce dramatically different outcomes (a 
catastrophic accident in one case, and nothing at all in another).74 If only 
voluntary human inputs (and not randomly generated outcomes) carry moral 
significance, then it becomes difficult to justify the law’s (and society’s) 
divergent treatment of actors in such pairs of cases.  The negligent driver or 
caregiver who causes a death is vilified and subjected to severe legal 
consequences, while her equally culpable doppelgänger who luckily avoids 
causing harm walks away unscathed.   
Viewing the generator of a risk as its “owner” offers a way to 
understand or at least normalize this apparent anomaly.  Letting outcomes 
                                                 
71 The statement in the text assumes that expected returns get built into the fair market value standard used to 
determine the adequacy of compensation.   
72 ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1999) 
73 See RIPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 72-74 (1999).  For discussion of moral luck, see e.g. Bernard Williams, 
Moral Luck, in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 at 20 (Cambridge U. Press 1981); Thomas Nagel, 
Moral Luck, in Mortal Questions 24 (Cambridge U. Press 1979); Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and 
Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387 (David G. Owen ed., Oxford U. Press 1995); 
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007).  
74 See Waldron, supra note 73, at 387 (giving the example of two momentarily distracted drivers, one of 
whom collides with a motorcyclist and the other of whom proceeds without incident); Nagel, supra note 73, at 30-
31 (“If one negligently leaves the bath running with the baby in it, one will realize, as one bounds up the stairs 
toward the bathroom, that if the baby has drowned one has done something awful, whereas if it has not one has 
merely been careless.”). 
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(both catastrophic and benign) fall on risk generators is arguably no more 
odd than leaving the upside and downside risks of a vegetable garden or a 
shopping development on an owner, even though external forces will 
determine whether certain acts of cultivation or neglect translate into 
success or failure. We do not usually agonize over the moral luck 
implications of the fact that one crop or mall succeeds while another fails; 
this is just the gamble that an owner takes.75 
The ownership concept sits uneasily in the tort framework, however, as 
Ripstein recognizes.76 Tort risks are typically not bounded by exclusion 
rights in the way that property tends to be.  This fact deprives actors of 
control over how risks will play out, 77 and requires that tort law synthesize 
some conceptual substitutes for  physical boundaries; these are embodied in 
doctrines like proximate cause, foreseeability, and duty—and, in most 
contexts, the idea of negligence.78 There is also the vexing problem that 
potential benefits generated when acting in the world are considerably less 
amenable to ownership under tort law than are potential harms.79 Tort 
doctrines may nonetheless be understood as forcing ownership of a subset 
of risks thought to align with the boundaries of the actor’s own benefit 
catchment system.   
Whether or not one finds the idea of risk ownership to be a satisfying 
normative answer to moral luck concerns or a helpful descriptive tool for 
understanding how tort law works, the exercise of considering it does cast 
new light on the meaning of  (actual) ownership.  Property can be 
conceptualized as “a leaky bucket of gambles.”80  It delivers not a basket of 
expected outcomes, but rather the outcomes themselves, over time.  The 
bucket is leaky and prone to sloshing, however: not all inputs are under the 
                                                 
75 Tony Honoré similarly casts tort liability as the outcome of a series of gambles in which most people win 
more than they lose.  Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Luck, 104 LAW Q. REV. 530, 539-41 (1988).    
76 See RIPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 47 (noting the indeterminacy of ownership “in a world of risks”).   
77 Exclusion offers a way of controlling the background against which risks play out and the identity and 
characteristics of parties exposed to the risks.  For example, members of a household without any young children 
can keep prescription medicines that are not in child-proof containers out on a countertop without thereby creating 
any significant risk, assuming no children are invited into the household and ordinary exclusion measures are 
taken to keep neighborhood children from wandering in unattended.  
78 While strict liability offers perhaps the clearest case of such “outcome-responsibility,” see Honoré, supra 
note 75 at 541, we can understand a negligence regime as merely constraining the set of outcomes for which one 
will be responsible.  Strict liability embeds constraints on liability-producing outcomes as well, albeit along lines 
other than fault, such as causation.  Another way to put the point is to say that “owning” all the risk one creates 
would place actors in unmanageable “common ownership” schemes with large sectors of the population.  Limits 
are clearly necessary. Yet because the limits on liability that the law constructs are not the boundaries that an 
owner selects, risk ownership is an interesting form of forced ownership (to the extent we think of it as ownership 
at all). 
79 See, e.g., Porat, supra note 10.  If all of the costs were charged to one’s account and none of the benefits, 
then there would be too little engagement in activities that do not cause expected harm on net. Indeed, one 
compelling rationale for limiting the scope of liability is to account for the positive spillovers associated with 
everyday activities. For an interesting discussion that focuses on the “duty” element’s role in providing this 
limitation, see Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, Boston Univ. School of Law,  Law 
and Economics Working Paper No. 06-04 (February 2006) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=887147. 
80 See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 66, at 1405, 1442-43. 
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owner’s control, and not all outcomes get fully charged to the owner. Still, 
ownership endeavors to achieve a reasonably well-aligned pairing of inputs 
and outcomes.81   
Ownership thus amounts to a container within which outcomes are 
one’s responsibility, and for which one bears any attendant risks one has not 
managed to offload to others.82 Tort doctrines and governance mechanisms 
may stretch this container to capture more of the normatively relevant 
outcomes or avoid capturing normatively irrelevant outcomes.83  But these 
same objectives might at times be pursued by extending or forcing 
ownership itself.   
 
B.  Ownership’s Edge 
 
Understanding that ownership’s basic strategy entails responsibility for 
outcomes, not inputs, helps explain the motivation for forced ownership. 
Identifying an owner means something different from imposing a charge: it 
is an answer to the question “whose problem is this?”84 There are sensible 
reasons why the law might choose to answer that question, rather than a 
series of other questions about the nature, extent, probable solution, and 
expected value of the problem.  The sections below offer a set of (somewhat 
overlapping) rationales for requiring ownership. Taken together, they focus 
on the potential for outcome responsibility, when channeled into particular 
patterns or broken into particular bundles, to address information and 
incentive problems.  
 
1. Economizing on Information 
 
One reason for forcing ownership is to economize on the costs of 
gathering and using information. Consider trover, which requires a party 
who has converted the property of another to purchase that property.  It 
might seem at first that a damage award would serve just as well, and 
                                                 
81 Achieving a perfect alignment would be unduly costly, but property should endeavor to charge or credit 
outcomes to the owner when it can do so cost-effectively. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property 
Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967) (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains 
of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.”).   
82 As the common availability of homeowner’s insurance suggests, owners need not personally bear all risks.  
The offloading of risk can be conceptualized as the division of ownership.  See BARZEL, supra note 69, at 6-7 
(observing that the supplier of service to a photocopier “is a residual claimant from the servicing operation” and 
hence a partial owner in the economic sense). 
83 Thus, for example, some property-mimicking doctrines in tort require or encourage actors to behave as if 
they are the single owner, even though they actually are not.  For example, the doctrine of private necessity allows 
a party to appropriate the property of another to preserve property or life, but she must pay for the damage thereby 
caused.   
84 See RIPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 47 (observing that after a normative account of the proper distribution of 
risks has been established, “talk of people owning risks and misfortunes is simply a way of spelling out the idea 
expressed in such familiar idioms as ‘that’s not my problem.’”).   
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indeed the remedy of replevin offers just such an alternative.85  An 
advantage of forcing ownership, however, is that it sidesteps the need to 
calculate damages.  Payment is based on the fair market value of the 
undamaged item; the transfer of the thing itself will credit back any 
remaining value to the new owner. 86  Disagreements about the extent of the 
damage need not be entertained, nor must the erstwhile owner bear the risk 
that the condition of the thing will deteriorate further as a result of 
additional hidden vulnerabilities (such as hairline fractures in a vase).   
In certain nuisance contexts, the forced purchase of affected property 
could operate similarly: the property might be forcibly transferred at its 
(unpolluted) fair market value, at the election of the current owners. 87 What 
is notable about this solution from an information cost perspective is that it 
does not require calculating damages in advance, or returning to court over 
time as consequences unfold. 88  The new single owner of the consolidated 
parcel will also be expected to make optimal decisions about how to 
coordinate conflicting land uses going forward.   
In the examples just given, the problem to which ownership was offered 
as a response was relatively well defined: a damaged object, a polluted 
parcel. But the information cost savings associated with the ownership 
strategy become even more important when the nature of the problems 
coming down the pike are as yet undefined.  The unknown and unknowable 
nature of future problems contributes to what we might identify as a 
generalized “fear of the unowned” in property theory.  Gaps in seisin are not 
permitted for real property under the common law, and the same rule 
applied to chattels until the sixteenth century.89  A likely reason was to 
make sure there was always someone who was responsible for the property, 
and to whom liability could attach if necessary.90   
                                                 
85 See supra note 14, and accompanying text.   
86 See Epstein, supra note 17, at 850-51 (“Once the chattel is damaged, it is tricky to figure out what 
damages are needed to make the plaintiff whole, so that the long-established election of remedy allows the 
plaintiff simply to liquidate his original investment for cash. The remedy of forced purchase requires the 
defendant, quite simply, to pick up the pieces when the chattel is destroyed and to take the up and down of its 
value when the chattel is taken.”).   
87 The literature on put options in the nuisance context has generally contemplated not the forced purchase of 
a possessory interest in the property, but rather the forced purchase of, say, the entitlement to pollute.  It has 
accordingly focused on a different kind of informational advantage: the capacity of the exercise of the put option 
to reveal information about which party values a given entitlement, such as the right to emit pollutants, more 
highly. See AYRES, supra note 5, at 18-27. As a form of liability rule, put options harness information just as call 
options do, but may be preferred for distributive or other reasons.  See id.  In the approach discussed in the text, 
the forced purchase of the possessory interest precedes a series of decisions that the new owner of the 
consolidated tract will make about how and whether to operate the factory; these decisions made by a single 
owner, rather than the exercise of the put option itself, will reveal which of two or more conflicting land uses is  
more valuable.   
88 These advantages may, of course, be overwhelmed by other disadvantages of the approach.  The goal here 
is to focus on unique advantages of ownership, not to suggest this is likely to be the all-things-considered best 
remedial course.   
89 See A.H. Hudson, Is Divesting Abandonment Possible at Common Law? 100 L.Q. REV. 110, 118 (1984).  
90 Id.  
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These rationales relate closely to the risk-bearing and incentive aspects 
of ownership, which will be developed below. But they find an additional 
footing in information cost savings by economizing on the very task of 
finding out who is in a good position to bear risk or respond to incentives.  
The ownership strategy farms out that entire set of problems, leaving the 
owner to decide what to do about them.  By limiting the ways in which 
people can rid themselves of both chattels and (especially) real property, the 
law tries to channel property reassignment into forums in which information 
costs are bearable. In the meantime, owners are kept paired with their 
properties, which reduces the costs of learning about their status.   
To say that it is useful to have some owner of record does not, of course, 
make a case for the current method for picking out who shall serve in that 
capacity. Gaps in seisin could be prevented equally well if unwanted 
property could be decisively ceded to, say, an agency of the state.91  Where 
property is objectively negative in value, an auction might be held to see 
who would accept the property at the lowest price.92 Some of these 
approaches might be good solutions in certain contexts, as will be discussed 
below. Yet all of them cost something to implement.  Letting ownership lay 
where it falls (just like letting liability lay where it falls) has the immediate 
edge of avoiding the need for society to incur costs identifying a better 
owner.   
 
2. Dispersing Obligations 
 
Ensuring that land remains owned does more than satisfy a societal 
sense of order.  It also maintains a platform for imposing obligations.93  
While the social obligations accompanying property ownership have 
received a great deal of recent attention,94 unwanted ownership pushes us to 
consider why these obligations would ever be imposed in kind.  Here 
another aspect of the information cost story becomes relevant: ownership’s 
ability to capitalize on the advantages of dispersed information gathering 
                                                 
91 See Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 394-95 (discussing civil law countries that permit relinquishment of real 
property to the state).   
92 See, e.g., HERBERT INHABER, SLAYING THE NIMBY DRAGON 41-69 (1998) (providing an accessible 
account of how a reverse Dutch auction can be used allocate bads); Herbert Inhaber, Market-Based Solution to the 
Problem of Nuclear and Toxic Waste Disposal, 41 J. AIR & WASTE MGT. ASSOC. 808, 812-15 (1991) (proposing 
such an auction approach for siting waste); Michael O’Hare, “Not on My Block You Don’t”: Facility Siting and 
the Strategic Importance of Compensation. 25 Public Policy 407, 438-56 (1977) (analyzing auction approaches to 
facility siting). 
93 See Peñalver, supra note 6, at 213 (suggesting that the affirmative obligations that accompany ownership 
explain common law limits on abandonment).    
94 Several accounts of this approach were presented in a 2009 symposium devoted to the topic. See, e.g., 
Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); 
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009); Joseph William Singer, Democratic 
Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009).  See also Ezra 
Rosser, Essay, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. _ (2013) 
(describing and critiquing various strands of the progressive property movement).   
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and monitoring.95      
Pervasive private land ownership creates a web of location-specific 
obligors who can be called upon to collectively accomplish large-scale 
tasks, like clearing a city’s entire sidewalk system of snow.96  Many of these 
tasks could be collectively provided and the owners charged, but giving 
each owner responsibilities over their own location offers a flexible and 
responsive system that can be scaled up or down and to which new duties 
can be added as needed.  Significantly, the system takes advantage of 
dispersed information and localized monitoring.97  Similarly, private 
measures to safeguard property, such as deadbolts and fences, can also 
reduce the cost of public enforcement (relative to a baseline in which the 
land is unowned or publicly owned).98 Again, the ability to engage in 
flexible, context specific measures based on local information may make 
private enforcement a useful complement to public enforcement.   
The widespread localized monitoring that accompanies dispersed 
private ownership also generates expectations among third parties that help 
to sustain social order.  Presumptively owned property may be less likely to 
be vandalized or broken into, on the assumption someone is looking after 
it.99 Likewise, the assumption that property is owned, and not up for grabs, 
can prevent wasteful or dangerous races to establish new ownership.100 
Warding off these acts is socially desirable; they can have harmful 
spillovers, in addition to potentially dissipating the value of the property.  
Of course, the social harms of non-ownership are not necessarily 
avoided through forced ownership. People can and do vacate and neglect 
their properties even if the law continues to recognize them as owners.  If 
they are judgment proof, they may shirk their obligations as owners with 
relative impunity.101 Similarly, dangerous and wasteful races can be 
                                                 
95 Thus, the law may have an interest in picking out owners who will serve these functions.  This might be 
used to explain, for example, the residency and use requirements associated  with the Homestead Act. See 
BARZEL, supra note 69, at 121-23 (suggesting that homesteading restrictions might be explained as a means “to 
induce settlers’ self-protection against raids where such protection was cheaper than direct protection by the 
state,” and “to ensure that the land would actually be densely occupied”).   
96 See Larissa M. Katz, Governing Through Owners, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2051 (2012). 
97 See id. at 2041-42, 2050 (giving an example in which a theater assigns each person a seat and charges her 
with putting out any fires that break out under that seat, thereby producing a “system of fire control for the entire 
theater”).   
98 Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Case for Imperfect Enforcement of Property Rights, 160 
U. Pa. L. Rev.  1927 (2012) (making the related point that the availability of public enforcement may create moral 
hazard as to private protective measures).   
99 See Hudson, supra note 89, at 117-18 (discussing vandalism as a possible risk with unowned property).   
100 Costly races to establish ownership are easy to envision with a first-in-time rule of physical possession.   
See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 374-75; id. at 409-11 (suggesting that a different first in time rule, such as 
granting rights to the first person to post a reply on a message board, would address concerns about “lawless 
races”).  Other ownership protocols may still produce deadweight losses, if less dramatic ones, as multiple people 
attempt to simultaneously fulfill the requirements for ownership.   
101 Legal responsibility may have some effect even on the judgment proof, insofar as they may hope or 
expect to not remain so forever.  Ownership also confronts owners with the opportunity cost of failing to make 
valuable use of the property, if such is possible.  Even a largely theoretical responsibility for the downsides 
associated with the property might cause owners to pay attention to the upsides as well.   
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produced not only by unowned things, but also by things that an owner 
offers to transfer at a below-market price.102 However, it is possible that 
ownership may operate on owners as a kind of moral suasion that causes 
them to act more responsibly toward the owned item. 103  Moreover, even if 
individual owners fall down on the job, the assumption that dispersed, 
concerned monitors are paying attention and looking out for property may 
create a kind of herd immunity that pushes back disorder.104 This rationale 
falls apart, however, if property neglect becomes obvious and widespread—
as may occur when involuntary ownership makes up a larger market share 
of all ownership.  
 
3. Consolidating Complements 
 
Sometimes it is more important to get a complementary set of property 
rights into the same hands than it is to get individual components into the 
highest-valuing hands.105 Although parties might be expected to voluntarily 
put together complementary bundles in most cases, sometimes intervention 
in the form of forced ownership plays a role.   
Accession and mistaken improver cases offer some of the simplest and 
clearest examples.  It is obvious that a canvas and the artwork painted on it 
should end up in the same ownership, just as it is obviously preferable to 
have an entire building and the land under it end up in the same hands.  
Because these situations present bilateral monopolies that may make it 
difficult for the parties involved to negotiate solutions, unilateral transfers 
are likely to be attractive alternatives.  Forcing one party to sell to the other 
is one alternative, but so too is forcing a party to buy from the other—and 
the latter might in some cases seem normatively preferable. Indeed, it is not 
uncommon to offer the encroached-upon party a choice between such 
                                                 
102 For example, the below-market pricing common on “Black Friday” has produced tramplings and other 
outbreaks of violence.  See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden & Angela Macropoulos, Wal-Mart Employee Trampled to 
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008; James Serna Black Friday Melee on Video at Georgia Wal-Mart, Trampling 
in Texas, L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 2012. 
103 Maintaining the ownership relationship could also influence the owner’s valuation of the thing in 
question, which could in turn affect behavior regarding it.  Although the nature, causes, and indeed existence of an 
“endowment effect” has been the subject of extensive recent debate, there is an observable real-world gap between 
the amount someone will pay to acquire something anew and the amount that one would accept to give the thing 
up—a gap that may have something to do with certain facets of ownership.  See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Sarah F. 
Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A New Theory of the Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1935, 
1941-49 (2008) (reviewing the literature on the endowment effect).  Whether and how such an effect would apply 
where the property is unwanted has not to my knowledge been studied.   
104 For example, a few unlocked cars or apartment doors in a sea of carefully secured properties will be 
unlikely to attract casual thieves or vandals, because the returns to trying every door are so  low.  Indeed, a 
nontrivial number of people subscribe to a “no lock” philosophy. See Joyce Wadler, The No Lock People, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010 (reporting on the phenomenon of people who regularly choose not to lock the doors to their 
homes, including some residents of New York and other major cities).   
105 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & 
ECON. S77, S92-99 (2011) (emphasizing the need to attend to the content of property packages, given positive 
transaction costs). 
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remedies:  buy out or be bought out.    
Many of the ways that law assigns rights to previously unowned 
resources can be understood through the lens of complementarity as well.  
The law of increase and accretion are good examples—property is added to 
proximate or logically related existing holdings.   Although instances could 
exist in which the interests will be more valuable if split apart, these are rare 
enough to make it efficient for the property system to make the assignments 
in the way that it does—even at the cost of sometimes mis-assigning 
resources.106 More generally, default property packages, which can be 
costly to break apart, are arguably designed to reflect complementarities.   
Other policies that pressure or encourage ownership can often be 
explained by complementarities. For example, New Jersey’s bundling of the 
right to defeat a variance with the purchase of the property for which the 
variance was sought may be understood as a way to force information about 
whether complementarities are present.107  Complementarities that inure to 
the benefit of the larger community can explain prohibitions on the 
destruction of historic properties under the tout ensemble doctrine.108  
 
4. Aligning Incentives  
 
Some unwanted ownership can be understood as buttressing the self-
enforcing incentive system that private property is thought to embody.  A 
standard example of (or metaphor for) the incentive alignment potential of 
property ownership is that of “reaping where one has sown.” Simple 
agrarian illustrations are popular, because they present a plausible scenario 
in which the benefits and burdens associated with one’s acts are confined to 
the physical plot one owns.109 The farmer in the example owns her own 
labor and the land; property law assigns her the crops that result from 
mixing these elements with inputs that she also owns, such as seeds and 
fertilizer. There are no significant externalities in the story. Whether 
property operates in this manner, however, depends crucially on the way in 
which ownership packages are scaled and defined.   
If we posit instead a “flyaway” crop that predictably lands a quarter mile 
southwest of where it is sown, the story does not work so well, unless the 
property is redefined to include the catchment area, or the crops themselves 
can somehow be associated with their sower.110 We cannot get incentive 
                                                 
106 Merrill offers a somewhat different explanation, that the law uses the past ownership of a related interest 
as a proxy for identifying a fit owner.  Merrill, supra note 17, at 488-91. 
107 See text accompanying note 20, supra.   
108 See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975) cert. denied 426 U.S. 905 (1976).   
109 These examples thus predominantly feature “small events,” to use Robert Ellickson’s nomenclature.  See 
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1325, 1327-30 (1993). 
110 Cf. Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881) (distinctive harpoon markings allowed whales to be identified 
with the harpooning whaler, despite the use of bomb lance technology that did not keep the whale physically 
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alignment by allowing the crop landing zone to be owned on its own, just as 
we cannot get incentive alignment if the crops stay put on the owned land 
but sprout noxious traveling spores whose effects are not charged back to 
the owner. Property boundaries must be set in a way that produces incentive 
alignment, or must be buttressed with governance structures that stand in 
for physical boundaries where the latter cannot realistically be employed.111 
Property’s social value, in other words, depends on package construction.   
Some unwanted ownership, then, may involve elements added to a 
given ownership package to better align incentives. If small properties 
enable more cross-boundary externalities, larger properties might be 
mandated. If short time slices of ownership lead to dealing in a present-
focused way with the land, longer time slices may be mandated.  If 
introducing rental housing or recreational opportunities into an area and 
then withdrawing them will visit terrible harms on the community, then 
keeping the use in place for a period of time may be mandated (even if it 
means that fewer owners choose to provide those opportunities initially).   
 Ownership bundles may also be constructed to moderate access to local 
public goods or common pool resources. The Tiebout hypothesis is built on 
the idea that procuring residential services also means purchasing a basket 
of local public goods and services.112 The idea of tying ownership 
obligations to common resource access is built into other observed 
arrangements as well, including cattle “wintering rules” used in some Swiss 
villages, which prohibit sending more cows to the grazing lands than one 
can feed during the winter,113 and medieval common field arrangements that 
scatter individually owned farming strips within a seasonal grazing 
commons.114    
 
III.  CHARTING FORCINGS 
  
The discussion to this point has suggested why ownership that is 
privately unwanted might nonetheless be socially valuable. This Part 
examines how forcings fit conceptually into the overall scheme of private 
ownership and state power.   
 
A.  Takings, Givings, Forcings, Relievings 
 
The government can reassign ownership of a given piece of property in 
                                                                                                                            
tethered to the whaling boat.   
111 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 67. 
112 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
113 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 62 (1990). 
114 See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
131, 146-54 (2000).  
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four basic ways: by exercising the eminent domain power (takings), by 
transferring property to willing parties (givings), by compelling ownership 
(forcings), or by accepting transfers of property from parties who do not 
wish to own it (relievings).115  Takings, givings, forcings and relievings 
could occur alone or in various combinations as governmental entities 
attempt to optimize land use.  Table 1 sets out the domains within which 
each of these moves would be minimally plausible as a normative and 
logical matter.116     
 
 
Table 1:  Domains of Government Action 
 
 Ownership  
(By a Nonowner) Is 
Socially Beneficial   
Ownership  
(By Current Owner)  
Is Socially  Costly 
Ownership Is 
Privately Beneficial 
(Wanted) 
I. GIVINGS II. TAKINGS 
(and other coercive 
dispossessions) 
Ownership Is 
Privately Costly 
(Unwanted) 
III. FORCINGS IV.  RELIEVINGS 
 
 
The distinction between Table 1’s top and bottom rows goes to whether 
ownership in a given instance is beneficial or costly to a given private party, 
The question is a subjective one: the fact that property imposes a private 
burden on A does not mean that it would impose a private burden on B. This 
subjective stance explains Table 1’s equation of private benefits and 
burdens with wanting or not wanting the property, respectively.117 While 
property with a negative expected value would be unwanted by almost 
everyone (at least in the absence of a compensating transfer payment), 
                                                 
115 There are of course many additional tools, such as taxes and subsidies, that the government can use to 
influence the attractiveness of ownership.   
116 By minimally plausible, I do not mean to suggest that the indicated form of government coercion will 
always or very often be appropriate, much less that it will always or very often be observed.  Rather, these are sets 
of necessary conditions, which may or may not be sufficient in a given instance to justify the use of government 
power.  It is also obviously possible for the government to engage in the acts named in the chart when the 
conditions are not met – as where eminent domain inefficiently moves property to a lower-valuing user.  The 
point of the chart is not to assert that government always or only engages in these acts when the stated conditions 
are met, but rather to suggest that these conditions would form a minimum predicate for an appropriate exercise of 
the power.     
117 I set aside the possibility that people want property that will harm their own subjectively perceived 
interests or want to be rid of property that will further their own subjectively perceived interests.   
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property need not have a negative expected value to be unwanted by 
particular parties; there may be autonomy or personhood issues at stake, or 
simple risk aversion.   
The distinction between Table 1’s left and right columns goes to 
whether ownership by the specified party is socially beneficial or socially 
costly. Because the table focuses on conditions that might cause the 
government to change the assignment of ownership, the left column 
involves socially beneficial ownership by someone who is currently not an 
owner, while the right column involves socially costly ownership by 
someone who is the current owner.  Much turns on the word “ownership.” If 
we assume that the government has free rein to make and collect transfer 
payments to address distributive or other justice concerns, the only reason 
to employ coercion to change a property’s ownership would be if ownership 
itself in a given pair of hands conferred social benefits or imposed social 
costs above and beyond what could be conveyed or collected through an 
expected-value equivalent transfer payment.118   
The most familiar manifestation of government coercion is found in 
Cell II:  takings and other coercive dispossessions.119 Takings become 
plausible when ownership (by the current owner) has become publicly 
costly120 yet remains privately beneficial to, and hence wanted by, that 
owner.  If the first condition were not met, the ownership change produced 
by the taking would lack normative justification, and if the second condition 
were not met, the transfer would not be coercive.   
Consider next Cell I, in which ownership by a given nonowner is both 
socially beneficial and privately beneficial for that party.  The government 
may confer ownership on the party—a giving.121 Thus, property condemned 
through eminent domain may be reconveyed to a private party. Notably, 
givings are not coercive insofar as the ownership interests they confer are 
either actively pursued—as is typically the case in the eminent domain 
context—or passively welcomed.  The collection of an associated payment 
                                                 
118 The ability of the government to make and collect transfer payments also carries implications for the 
stability of the rows, as discussed below.  See infra Part III.D. 
119 “Takings” is a doctrinal term of art that builds in a payment obligation.  Because some government 
actions that dispossess owners coercively do not require compensation (consider, for example, civil forfeitures), 
the cell’s description must be broadened beyond those actions that would count as takings.  The term “givings” 
has not been imbued with a parallel collection requirement and so can encompass both collectable and non-
collectable transfers. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 590-604 (distinguishing chargeable from 
nonchargeable givings); see also id. at 549, n.2 (suggesting some ambiguity on this point, and the possibility that 
nonchargeable givings might not need to be referred to as givings).  I will use the terms “forcings” and 
“relievings” in a similarly inclusive manner.  The question of transfer payments to accompany these moves will be 
examined below.  See infra Part III.C.  For ease of exposition, I will use the unadorned term “takings” to refer to 
all coercive dispossessions, except where it becomes necessary to draw a distinction between compensated and 
uncompensated dispossessions.   
120 Ownership might be publicly costly because of direct effects (nuisance, blight) or because of opportunity 
costs (because it blocks ownership by a higher valuing user).   
121 My use of the term “giving” here corresponds to Bell and Parchomovsky’s category of “physical 
givings.” See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 564, 567-69. 
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for a giving may be coercive, however—a point to which I will return 
below.122    
The bottom row of Table 1 contains exercises of governmental power 
with respect to property interests that impose net private burdens.  Cell III 
represents the convergence of privately burdensome but publicly beneficial 
ownership—circumstances in which forcings might become plausible.123  
Recognizing forcings suggests a fourth category, here dubbed 
“relievings.”  Relievings lift the obligations of ownership upon approval of 
the erstwhile owner and place them upon a new owner (who might be the 
government).  This approach becomes plausible when ownership by a 
current owner is both socially costly and privately burdensome. The 
relationship between forcings and relievings bears examination.  Forcings 
make relievings less costly by opening up the possibility of compelled 
transfers to private parties. Conversely, the failure to offer a relieving 
mechanism will, at least under certain conditions, produce a form of forced 
ownership by compelling retention.   
 
B.  Ownership Alignments and Misalignments 
 
Table I offers insight into mismatches that might occur between private 
and social payoffs and between these payoffs and the current ownership 
assignment. In Cells II and III, current ownership aligns with private 
payoffs but misaligns with societal payoffs.  By contrast, Cells I and IV 
present situations in which current ownership is misaligned with both social 
and private payoffs. Mismatches between private and social costs present 
conditions for potential coercion against the party in question (Cells II and 
III), while correspondence between private and social costs (Cells I and IV) 
presents conditions in which the party in question might be the beneficiary 
of coercive action that the government takes against others.   
Of course, ownership is often aligned with both social and private 
payoffs.  Table II shows how the domains of government action introduced 
in Table I fit together with ordinary ownership and nonownership, as well 
as with some additional types of misalignment.   
 
                                                 
122 My focus here is on possessory ownership interests.  The broader literature on givings focuses primarily 
on “windfall recapture” associated with the conferral of nonpossessory benefits on landowners.  When coercively 
applied, this model edges close to a forcing, but remains distinguishable for reasons discussed below.  See infra 
Part IV.A.1.  
123 The focus here is on cases where a current nonowner would be compelled to become an owner, but as we 
will soon see, there is a shadow form of forcings that involves forced retention by a current owner.  It should be 
noted, however, that forced retentions are heterogeneous than the forced acquisitions under consideration here, 
insofar as private and public acts and omissions can combine in innumerable ways to make it practically difficult 
or legally impossible to terminate ownership.     
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Table 2:  Aligned and Misaligned Ownership 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 expands the lefthand column shown in Table 1 to include socially 
beneficial ownership by the current owner as well as by a current 
nonowner, and expands the righthand column to include socially costly 
ownership by a nonowner as well as by a current owner.  
When these states of the world are added, two new misalignment 
possibilities emerge.  The first is found in Cell II, where ownership is 
desired by a nonowner but is socially costly. Blocked acquisition would 
respond to this particular misalignment of private and social payoffs. For 
example, eligibility criteria might be applied to would-be landowners to 
establish that they have the wherewithal to care for the property and to 
ensure that they will not be able to shirk in ways that will offload costs on 
society.  
An additional misalignment emerges in Cell III, where a current owner 
finds ownership privately costly, though it remains socially beneficial.  
Here, a potential governmental response is forced retention.  Alienability 
restrictions and bans on abandonment of real property offer real-world 
examples. There is, however, an empirical question about whether the 
compelled prolongation of ownership actually produces social benefits that 
would  justify the Cell III placement, or whether forced retention instead 
produces the sorts of social costs that might locate the situation in Cell IV, 
the proper domain of relievings.124   
Table 2’s expanded set of alternatives also includes two ubiquitous 
                                                 
124 I discuss below one reason that the Cell III characterization might remain accurate even if forced 
retention itself inflicts costs on society.  See text accompanying note 144, infra. 
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cases of complete alignment between private and social payoffs and 
ownership assignment.  The first, found in Cell I, is ordinary ownership; 
here, the current owner finds ownership beneficial, and so does society.  
Cell IV contains the opposite (but equally congenial) situation in which a 
nonowner views ownership as aversive and so too does society.  Together, 
these cells might suggest that private and social payoffs to ownership are 
not independent of each other.  Thus, we might say that in the ordinary case 
of ownership, the social benefits largely flow from the very fact that the 
ownership is deemed privately beneficial.  Similarly, in the ordinary case of 
nonownership, social costs stem from the unwanted status of the property.   
These observations might lead us to question whether there is any 
meaningful content in Cells II and III. Underpinning the presumed 
correlation between private and social returns to ownership, however, is an 
implicit assumption that the market system works with reasonable 
efficiency in assigning ownership to high valuers.  The fact that a person 
values ownership enough to win it under such a system makes out a pretty 
good  (although not airtight) case that her ownership will also be socially 
beneficial.   Similarly, the fact that one does not value ownership enough to 
win it under these same market conditions suggests that one’s ownership is 
likely to impose social costs—at the very least, the opportunity cost 
associated with keeping the property out of the hands of a higher valuer.   
Why then would misalignments occur between the private and social 
costs or benefits of ownership?  To ask the question is to suggest its answer: 
externalities. Some property entitlements may attract high bidders who are 
only willing and able to attain that status because ownership offers 
opportunities to offload costs on others. Conversely, ownership may fail to 
attract the most socially valuable voluntary owners if too many of the social 
benefits produced by ownership take the form of positive externalities the 
owner cannot capture.  Holdout problems that impede the movement of 
property to a higher valuer represent a special case of externalities.  Here, 
overstated private valuations aimed at garnering more surplus from a 
transfer can actually keep the property from reaching a higher valuer—a 
social loss that exceeds the harms suffered by the overstater alone.   
 
C.  Realignments With and Without Compensation 
 
It is well understood that takings (as well as uncompensated 
confiscations and regulations) can address externalities. But how could 
forced ownership do so?  There are two possibilities, though we will soon 
encounter difficulties, familiar from takings jurisprudence, in telling them 
apart. The first involves using coerced ownership to internalize normatively 
relevant impacts.  Thus, property boundaries might be drawn or redrawn to 
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require owners to accept a full package of outcomes or nothing at all. 
Likewise, certain acts undertaken on or with property may be bundled with 
their consequences (the break and buy rule).      
Alternatively, forced ownership might amount to a mandate that a party 
undertake or continue an ownership relationship that will produce positive 
spillovers for (or absorb negative spillovers from) the community.  Because 
this alternative is most likely to be valuable to society where the 
individual’s past choices (including existing property holdings) make her 
especially well-suited to be the owner of the aversive element, it too may 
appear to present nothing more than a bundling requirement.  Accordingly, 
it cannot be distinguished from the first case solely on the basis of whether 
the ownership in question is imposed out of the blue or linked to some 
earlier action or acquisition.   
Rather, the two cases are distinguishable only on normative grounds. Is 
the law merely squaring things up so that the owner shoulders burdens 
commensurate with her own operations in the world, or is has it slipped into 
the owner’s domain an extra burden that the owner should not by rights 
have to bear?  In the first case, the forced ownership removes a distortion so 
that ownership’s built-in incentive structure can operate unimpeded. In the 
second case, ownership is imposed to glean some set of societal benefits 
that the owner has no duty to provide. This need not mean that the forcing is 
normatively off-limits. Perhaps the benefits it would provide cannot be 
acquired at all, or cannot be acquired as cost-effectively, through mere 
monetary obligations. If the forcing is cost-justified but the burden it 
imposes is not distributively justified, compensation might be used in 
conjunction with coercion.125   
The normative bifurcation just described mirrors one familiar from the 
takings arena.  In that context, instead of coercively imposing or 
augmenting ownership, the government is coercively taking away 
ownership, or whittling it down.126 Some incursions into property rights are 
deemed normatively appropriate without compensation because they 
address impacts that the owner never had any right to impose. The so-called 
nuisance exception to the takings clause is the clearest example, but there 
are other “background principles” that are understood to condition title.127  
                                                 
125 This assumes that other normative hurdles are cleared, and that it is possible to compensate for the losses 
in question—which may not always be the case where incursions into autonomy are concerned.  See infra Part 
IV.B. 
126 Thus, where forcings can be recast as mandatory bundling, takings can be recast as mandatory 
unbundling.  When property is taken through eminent domain, ownership tomorrow is unbundled from ownership 
yesterday; the unified fee simple package is coercively split. Lesser incursions into property rights may remove 
certain prerogatives of ownership or physically commandeer certain pieces of a given parcel.    
127 In the case of regulatory incursions, compensation may be unnecessary because the burden is sufficiently 
slight or sufficiently reciprocal to count as a taking—in the words of Justice Holmes, it does not go “too far.”  
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahan.  Regulatory takings analysis is primarily governed by the Penn Central standard. I 
will consider below what a Penn Central analogue would look like in the forcings context.   
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In other cases, however, the individual has a clear normative right to the 
property interest in question, but her ownership is imposing social costs that 
make it efficient for the state to end it through a taking. If the constitutional 
requirement of public use is met, the taking can proceed, but just 
compensation is required.      
Just as governmentally coerced ownership changes can come with or 
without compensation, so too can unaltered ownership states be 
accompanied by payments flowing to or from the government. More 
broadly, payments to and from the government can either substitute for or 
accompany governmental actions directed at changing or retaining existing 
ownership assignments.  All of the alternatives shown in Table 2 can thus 
be broken down into compensated and uncompensated versions, as Table 3 
illustrates.  
 
Table 3:  Compensated and Uncompensated Alternatives 
 
 
 
As Cell III reflects, both forced acquisition and forced retention can be 
compensated or not.  In Cell II, we find takings.  Because “takings” is a 
constitutional term of art that implies mandatory compensation, takings are 
always compensated.  However, uncompensated incursions are certainly 
possible, such as shutting down nuisances, regulating property uses, or 
tearing down a house to stop a fire from spreading.128 As the bottom half of 
Cell II indicates, blocked acquisitions might also come with compensation 
if the blockage is socially valuable but the burden it imposes is not 
                                                 
128 See, e.g., DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 110-20 (2002) (describing 
categories of governmental actions that are exempted from takings clause scrutiny).. 
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normatively justified.129 Likewise a Cell I possessory “giving” (as following 
eminent domain) might or might not be “chargeable” to the recipient.130 
And a Cell IV relieving might or might not require payment on the part of 
the owner who is relieved of ownership. 
Consider next the Cell I and IV situations of ordinary ownership and 
ordinary nonownership.  These are instances where private and social costs 
align with the existing ownership arrangement, and no change in ownership 
is indicated. These states of the world can nonetheless be accompanied with 
payments to address distributive imbalances or internalize externalities.  In 
the bottom half of Cell IV, we find ordinary nonownership that can be 
accompanied (or not) by taxes, fees, damages, and so on.  Thus, a remedy 
for damaging or encroaching on property might be in order for distributive 
or corrective reasons, but it would not necessarily have to take the form of 
coercively altering the ownership assignment.  Similarly, rather than forcing 
someone to buy additional buffer land around a polluting factory, damages 
might instead be assessed while allowing nonownership (of that buffer land) 
to continue. Likewise, Cell I’s ordinary ownership might be accompanied 
by various forms of “windfall recapture” designed to keep the owner from 
unfairly enjoying spillovers from other properties. Thus, it may not be 
necessary to actually consolidate possessory ownership in those other 
owners or in the windfall recipient in order to align incentives. 
The important point to glean from the entries in Table 3 is that questions 
about the appropriateness of distributive benefits or burdens can be 
disaggregated from questions about the social benefits or costs uniquely 
associated with ownership. Payments or collections can occur in 
conjunction with or instead of coercive changes in ownership.  Thus, forced 
ownership should never be used merely to impose a deserved burden if the 
expected value equivalent fee or tax would serve as well.  By the same 
token, forced ownership should not necessarily be taken off the table simply 
because it would impose an undeserved burden on its own, given the ability 
to accompany it with compensation.131  
Because the distributive picture can be separately adjusted through 
transfer payments, the important question is whether starting, ending, or 
maintaining ownership itself in a particular set of hands produces unique 
benefits or inflicts unique costs.  Yet even if we answer this question in the 
affirmative, alternatives to outright coercion may still dominate, as the next 
section explains.   
                                                 
129 Real world examples of blocked acquisitions tend to be based on normative premises that would make 
compensation seem inappropriate.  For example, a felon may be kept from purchasing a gun without triggering 
any compensation requirement.  We might wonder, however, whether there might be instances in which disabling 
people from owning property should come with compensation.   
130 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 590-604. 
131 To be sure, there are many questions about the type and amount of compensation that would be adequate 
in particular circumstances.  See infra Part IV.B.3. 
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D.  Repricing Ownership 
 
The tables to this point have treated the private party’s desire for or 
aversion to ownership as a stable fact.  But there are many things that the 
law can do to influence the attractiveness of ownership relative to 
nonownership—including (but not limited to) taxing it or subsidizing it. If 
ownership produces social benefits, it might be encouraged rather than 
forced, and if it produces social harms, it might be discouraged rather than 
terminated. Such moves could change unwanted property to wanted (and 
vice versa) generating shifts between the rows in the tables above and 
addressing misalignments between private and social payoffs through 
liability rule solutions.  
Moreover, if society properly sets the prices, the fact that a payment (or 
forgone collection) accompanies a given ownership choice could change the 
societal assessment of whether that ownership choice generates social 
benefits or costs.132  Thus, a repricing of ownership could not only produce 
societally preferred ownership and nonownership patterns, it could 
potentially lead to a new understanding of which column a given situation is 
understood to reside within.  
It is useful to distinguish the discussion here from the one in the 
previous section.  The previous discussion established that monetary 
payments to or from the government can often be used to address 
externalities directly, without tinkering with ownership. This would be the 
preferred path if ownership itself did not uniquely confer benefits (or 
impose costs). The discussion here assumes that ownership does uniquely 
confer benefits (or impose costs), but examines ways to bring about 
changes in ownership without directly imposing those changes by fiat.  
Thus, there are two distinct ways that coercive reassignments of ownership 
might be dodged: by using a technology other than ownership to address 
external impacts, and by using a repricing mechanism rather than outright 
coercion to induce desired ownership patterns.   
Wholesale repricing of ownership can be accomplished either through a 
system of taxes or subsidies, or by altering other aspects of the ownership 
package.133  The sections below consider each in turn.   
 
1. Pigouvian Taxes and Subsidies    
 
                                                 
132 I refer here to the well-known information forcing properties of liability rules. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 725 
(1996). 
133 As discussed in Part IV.A.2 below, more targeted or individualized repricing might also be pursued 
through auction mechanisms or price schedules that are refined to account for complementarities.   
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Suppose a nonowner would find ownership privately beneficial, but that 
ownership relationship will impose social costs.  Blocked acquisition would 
be an alternative, as Cell II indicates.  But the discussion above suggests 
another possibility: Pigouvian taxes might be imposed to change an 
ownership relationship that is desired because of the cost-offloading 
opportunities it provides into an appropriately priced, and hence unwanted, 
ownership relationship.  If the tax is set right, and if the net social costs are 
indeed positive,134 no acquisition occurs and we shift into Cell IV’s realm of 
ordinary nonownership.   
A converse possibility is presented by Cell III, where a nonowner would 
find ownership aversive, but that ownership relationship would produce 
social benefits.  Just as Pigouvian taxes offer an alternative way to address 
the Cell II misalignment flagged above, Pigouvian subsidies might be used 
to transform property that is unwanted by a nonowner into property that is 
wanted by its (new) owner—a Cell I case of ordinary ownership.  In the 
case of real property, this might mean setting a very low or even negative 
price.  For example, Gary, Indiana has recently begun selling vacant homes 
for just $1 to qualifying buyers,135 and Detroit’s mayor has introduced 
initiatives to provide forgiveable loans and renovation funds to owners 
willing to buy vacant houses.136  
Similar possibilities exist for the other coercive alternatives shown in 
tables above.  Distributive considerations will vary among contexts, but the 
fact that society can choose between taxes and subsidies (or combinations 
thereof) 137 offers a great deal of flexibility.138 There are some difficulties: 
judgment proof parties may be unable to meet tax obligations,139 and 
governmental bodies suffering from fiscal illusion may be unwilling to pay 
for benefits. But many problems of misaligned ownership can be addressed 
in this way.   
 
                                                 
134 The social costs in Tables 1 and 2 are net of any benefits that would be enjoyed by the owner (or anyone 
else).  Thus, it is not necessary to balance the private benefits against the social costs.  Often, liability rules are 
used where the private benefits are unknown, as a way to elicit them and gauge whether they exceed the social 
costs.  See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 132, at 725. 
135 Steven Yaccino, A Chance to Own a Home for $1 in a City on the Ropes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2013.   
136 Kamelia Angelova, Detroit Will PAY You to Take One of These 100 Abandoned Homes, BUSINESS 
INSIDER, Feb. 16, 2011, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/abandoned-houses-detroit-2011-2?op=1  
137 In some cases the distributive picture is more complicated.  Consider a case in which the amount that is 
required to convince a party to voluntarily part with the property is greater than what seems justified on 
distributive grounds.  The party could be given a tax and subsidy combination that together captures the 
differential in societal value between giving up and keeping ownership.  Thus, for example, fair market value 
might be offered to a landowner who cedes ownership but some additional increment necessary to make up the 
owner’s reservation price might be taxed for keeping ownership.  The resulting spread between keeping the 
property and giving up the property would meet or exceed the party’s full reservation price, but it would not all 
have to be paid out in compensation.  
138 For example, if paying to induce the preferred ownership choice would not be appropriate as a matter of 
distribution, a tax might instead be applied to the less preferred ownership opportunity.   
139 This is a particular  issue in the case of abandonment, but one that might be met through a bonding 
mechanism.  See infra Part IV.A.3. 
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2. Adjusting the Ownership Bargain 
 
There are many things that society can do to alter the relative 
attractiveness of ownership and nonownership beyond attaching taxes or 
subsidies to these choices. Most notably, the bundling together of different 
ownership elements can alter the attractiveness of each. Where new or 
continuing ownership obligations attach to other or earlier ownership 
choices, one can reject the package by never becoming an owner in the first 
place.140 Where ownership obligations attach to non-ownership conduct 
(such as tortious behavior), rejection of the package may take the form of 
changes in primary behavior. Thus, for example, people may interact less 
with the chattels of others if they run the risk of being forced to purchase 
anything that they damage.141  
In some cases, these avoidance behaviors may be socially valuable.  
Indeed, they may be the entire point of the bundling exercise in question. 
For example, Ian Ayres has suggested that put options could provide 
valuable deterrence where they are granted to victims upon the invasion of 
their property interests—though he recognizes a risk of overdeterrence if the 
strike price is not set appropriately.142  Similarly, making property interests 
harder to alienate makes them less attractive to those who would acquire 
them only to gain bargaining leverage over another party.143   
In other cases, however, added ownership burdens may produce 
distortions by effectively taxing the earlier ownership or activity decision—
and in a manner that does not serve to align private and social costs. This 
possibility exists, for example, where ownership obligations generate 
nonreciprocal social gains or impose uncompensated burdens. Recognizing 
the ways in which bundling can either pull apart or realign the social and 
private payoffs of ownership leads to interesting lines of inquiry. If widely 
dispersed private property ownership generally confers benefits on society, 
                                                 
140 Obviously, would-be owners are unlikely to swear off ownership altogether in response to a given 
aversive bundle; rather, they will attempt to find bundles that have acceptable expected values and risks.  See 
Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 400-02 (suggesting that limits on abandonment may lead to less risk-taking in initial 
acquisition decisions).   
141 See Epstein, supra note 17, at 850.   In these cases, it might not seem any “ownership bargain” is being 
adjusted at all, since the triggering condition is tortious behavior and ownership first appears as a penalty.  
However, remedies like trover can actually be characterized as bundling ownership interests through something 
like a doctrine of relation back.  Having broken the thing, it is as if one acquired it before the breakage happened.  
One is made retroactively responsible in a way that is indistinguishable from having been the thing’s owner at the 
moment one first laid hands on it.  It is this earlier proto-ownership relationship that is repriced as a result of the 
remedial regime.    
142 See AYRES, supra note 5, at 34-36. Of course, complicated protocols for setting the strike price would 
undo the information cost advantages mentioned earlier.  
143 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (2009) (discussing 
instances in which downstream inalienability—a way of pressuring continued ownership—is used to  discourage 
initial acquisitions); Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and 
Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV 45 (1999) (examining inalienability as a means to control the strategic wielding of 
legal rights).  
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aversive elements in the property package deserve examination to see what 
they are buying society and what they might be costing society (either in 
unwanted behavioral changes, or in other aspects of the ownership package 
that counterbalance their effects).   
Consider forced retention. It has been suggested prohibitions on 
abandonment may generate more socially valuable decisions about entering 
into and carrying on ownership.144 The ownership package as a whole might 
produce social value, then, even if a snapshot during the end stages might 
suggest otherwise.  In other words, the ownership relationship might be 
described as socially beneficial (and hence properly located in Cell III) 
because the cost of allowing the owner to end it unilaterally would include 
forgoing certain ex ante owner-selection benefits that exceed the costs that 
the unwanted ownership relationship inflicts on society ex post. On the 
other hand, the inability to end an ownership relationship on one’s own 
initiative may produce harmful selection effects ex ante—selecting not for 
the willingness to accept costs associated with unwanted retention, but 
rather for the ability to offload the bulk of those costs on society.   
Importantly, there are multiple dimensions along which the 
attractiveness of ownership can be adjusted.  Aversive elements of 
ownership that do not add social value should receive particular scrutiny.  
One such element comprises risk factors that an owner has no ability to 
control.145 Where the relevant risks are amenable to the owner’s control, in 
whole or in part, responsibility for outcomes can help to align incentives—a 
social benefit.  But responsibility for risks that are not under the owner’s 
control cannot do this.  Unless the exposure in question is doing something 
else, such as adding diversification or hedging against specific other risks 
that the owner faces,146 it represents a gamble that the owner may not desire 
and may be in a poor position to bear.  Improving the capacity to slice off 
and neutralize uncontrollable risks is one way to make the overall 
ownership bargain more attractive to potential owners at relatively low 
social cost.  
Other aspects of the ownership bundle influence the attractiveness of 
private property ownership as well. Traditionally, owners have been 
delegated a large measure of freedom in determining how to use their 
properties.147  But as urbanization has led to increasingly strict land use 
                                                 
144 See Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 401 (“a regime that prevents individuals from abandoning real property 
might encourage them to use the property in a more sustainable way”); Peñalver, supra note 6, at 214 (“The 
common law's distrust of abandonment seems less alien and arbitrary if we approach it from the perspective of a 
community in which things are acquired, not in anticipation of quickly throwing them away, but to be kept and 
(re)used, or perhaps resold or given away.”).    
145 These risks produce a large proportion of the variance associated with homeownership.  See, e.g., Lee 
Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008). 
146For example, home equity risk might be used to hedge the risk associated with a future home purchase in 
the same market or a correlated market.   
147 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, supra note 65, at 1719, 1728, 1754–55 (discussing the ways in which property 
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controls, and as zoning has classified uses at finer grains, the ability for 
owners to freely choose their own agendas for the property has become 
increasingly constrained.148  However important and inevitable this 
development may be, it does alter the value of property to owners.   
Ownership also grants a spatial monopoly—an attribute that might seem 
to grow more valuable as urban densities increase. Owners of fortuitously 
positioned properties might (or might not) be able to leverage that 
monopoly position into substantial shares of surplus from land use 
assemblies and other thin-market transactions.149 The chance of exploiting 
such a privileged position may be attractive to risk-seeking or optimistic 
owners.  If eminent domain stands ready to step in, or if other doctrines 
such as “abuse of property right” limit the degree to which owners can hold 
out,150 the potential monopoly power of the owner diminishes accordingly.  
Whatever one may think about this normatively,151 it presents the 
interesting positive question of whether curtailing such sources of upside 
variance reduce the attractiveness of ownership, at least where downside 
risks remain the problem of the owner.152 
To be sure, ownership’s attractions, at least for individual households, 
often run deeper than the allocation of risks and benefits. Ownership may 
simply push the right psychological buttons by purporting to grant owners 
an exclusive domain—even if it cannot really deliver on it. There are 
cultural factors at work as well, along with advantages that may be largely 
contingent on particular legal and social features. For example, homeowners 
in the U.S. tend to enjoy much greater security of tenure than renters.  Thus, 
the relationship between private and social benefits is mutable.  Different 
motivations may also resonate with different sorts of owner—a point that 
may matter to the extent that small-scale widespread ownership is thought 
to carry advantages that are different than those that can be achieved 
through large ownership blocks.  
The point is a general one: recalibrating the ownership package offers 
one way to address or arrest misalignments between private and social 
payoffs to ownership.  And it may at times be the least costly way to 
achieve that result.   
 
                                                                                                                            
delegates decisions to owners). 
148 See Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 289-93 (2008) 
(developing the idea of owners as agenda setters). 
149 The well-known potential of holdouts to prevent successful land assemblies or raise their costs makes it 
highly speculative to what extent any owner might expect to reap an unusually large surplus.   
150 See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 122 
YALE L.J. 1444 (2013). 
151 The degree to which ownership can, should, must, or must not embed the power to hold out for more than 
one’s true reservation price in an effort to glean surplus from another party is a subject of much debate.   
152 Downside risks may be truncated by lenders’ inability (legal or practical) to hold borrowers responsible 
for mortgage balances that exceed home values.  See, e.g., Zywicki and Adamson, supra note 26, at 30. 
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IV.  THE USE AND MISUSE OF FORCINGS   
 
A better understanding of the category of forcings can both open up new 
policy alternatives and challenge existing ones. The analysis above 
pointedly raised questions about why forced ownership would ever 
dominate the strategy of repricing ownership, or the simple collection of 
money from parties who have imposed negative externalities or enjoyed 
positive ones.  Section A considers the scope and limits of these and other 
alternatives short of compelling full-strength possessory ownership. 
Sections B and C explore how a doctrine of forcings might be formulated 
and cabined, focusing on compensated and uncompensated forcings, 
respectively.  Section D briefly explores the domain of relievings.   
 
A.  Alternatives to Forced Ownership 
 
Compulsory ownership occupies a potentially interesting niche in 
property law, but may be used in ways that are neither necessary nor 
appropriate.  Pulling apart the rationales for forcing ownership reveals that 
very often an alternative short of full-fledged possessory ownership will be 
more suitable.153 In some cases, what is really desired is not ownership 
itself, but rather a collection mechanism for imposing normatively justified 
burdens. Even when ownership produces unique benefits, it might be 
encouraged through pricing mechanisms, including auctions. Finally, stakes 
in a particular property or enterprise could be mandated without requiring 
possession, or downside risk alone could be assigned through a bonding 
mechanism.   
 
1. Collections Distinguished 
 
As the discussion above indicated, the fact that it is normatively 
appropriate to impose a burden on a particular party does not establish, on 
its own, that the burden should take the form of an unwanted ownership 
interest. Thus, externalities may often be addressed through systems of 
payments and collections. Mundane examples include the imposition of 
taxes, fees, and damages of various sorts when a party’s actions cause 
impacts that her own property ownership interests do not automatically 
charge against her account. A look at the less familiar realm of 
governmental givings helps to further illuminate the distinction between 
collecting funds and imposing ownership.   
Governmental actions can bestow benefits as well as impose 
                                                 
153 Although these alternatives may be less intrusive, they would not necessarily eliminate the need to 
evaluate burdens under the takings clause.   
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burdens.154 Sometimes these benefits are actively sought by their recipients; 
at other times, the government simply enacts a policy or plan that benefits a 
particular area or a particular group, while burdening others. The givings 
literature has focused on the challenge of recapturing the windfalls that arise 
through government action.155 Central questions involve when and how 
charges can be imposed for benefits conferred.156      
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have focused on a number of 
features that they find relevant to the question of charging for benefits.157  
One of these features is what they term “refusability.”158  They note that a 
benefit that is forced on a recipient and then coupled with a charge amounts 
to a put option—i.e., a forcing.  Because they find forcings objectionable 
and inconsistent with autonomy, they suggest instead that charges only 
apply after the individual has accepted the benefit, or after she has realized a 
gain associated with it (as upon sale of a benefited property).159 Their first 
alternative, actual acceptance, fits well with the term “giving” insofar as it 
requires the recipient’s consent (though perhaps it is better understood as 
“selling” given that payment is demanded in exchange).    
Bell and Parchomovsky’s second alternative, the coerced collection of a 
realized gain, sounds more like a forced purchase.  Yet in an important 
sense, it is not.  As suggested above, the ownership strategy is crucially 
about responsibility for outcomes rather than expected values, and hence 
involves bearing risk.  If the governmentally-installed improvement down 
the street from a given home is expected to generate $100K in added value 
for that home, then truly forcing a sale of those benefits would mean 
collecting now and letting the homeowner bear the risk that the actual value 
added will be higher or lower.  Under Bell and Parchomovsky’s approach, 
this risk is not borne by the homeowner.  Instead, she only disgorges the 
benefits that she actually realizes upon sale.  This has a financial impact on 
her, to be sure, but it does not require her to bear the risk of outcome-
ownership.  
 
2. Repricing (and Its Limits) 
 
Ownership in a private party’s hands may dominate a system of transfer 
payments if that party is better positioned to bear or influence the variance 
                                                 
154 Indeed, unless governmental actions are imposed for no reason, they are necessarily accompanied by 
benefits that go to other parties. Takings thus imply givings. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 549 
(“Like a reflection in a mirror, the massive universe of takings is everywhere accompanied by givings.”)     
155 See generally id.; Hagman & Misczynski, supra note 9. 
156 See, e.g., Rachelle Alterman, Land Use Regulations and Property Values: The “Windfalls Recapture” 
Idea, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON URBAN ECONOMICS AND PLANNING (Nancy Brooks, Kieran Donaghy and 
Gerrit-Jan Knapp, eds., 2012). 
157 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 590-605.   
158 Id. at 601-04. 
159 Id. at 603-04. 
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associated with potential outcomes. This does not establish that ownership 
should be forced, however—it might instead be repriced.160   
Heterogeneity in the benefits or costs produced by ownership in 
different places or in the hands of different owners can make pricing 
challenging, as can nonlinearities in the cumulative effects of ownership 
patterns.  The latter phenomenon can be illustrated well by studies showing 
that clusters of foreclosures within close proximity of each other have 
disproportionately large effects on nearby property values.161 Consequently, 
the social benefits of addressing foreclosure spillovers through changes in 
ownership patterns might grow nonlinearly as the number of such 
forcelosures increases.  Similarly, inducing ownership here may be more 
valuable than inducing ownership there, or a particular spatial pattern of 
ownership or nonownership may be especially important to achieve or 
avoid.   
Of course, it is not necessary that a repricing strategy be pursued across-
the-board for a particular type of ownership; more tailored possibilities 
exist.  For example, if it is essential that a particular parcels pass into 
private ownership (or into new private ownership) without fail, then some 
kind of auction mechanism might be used.  The fact that a given parcel 
might have negative expected value presents no impediment; auctions can 
easily be used to allocate bads as well as goods.  This point is readily 
illustrated by airline oversales procedures, which typically employ an 
informal auction mechanism to get sufficient passengers to accept the bad—
a bump to a later flight.162   
Repricing can also be tailored to differentially attract different potential 
owners. Thus, a subsidy program might be limited to people who are 
especially well-positioned to take on a certain ownership obligation.163  An 
example of such selective repricing is found in “blotting” programs that 
allow homeowners to cheaply purchase city-owned vacant lots that adjoin 
their own residential parcels.164 The program can be understood as an 
                                                 
160 See supra Part III.D. 
161 See, e.g., Jenny Schuetz, Vicki Been, and Ingrid Gould Ellen, Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated 
Mortgage Foreclosures, 17 J HOUS. ECON 306, 317 (2008); [add new studies]. 
162 The approach can be classified as a reverse Dutch auction, with increasingly larger amounts offered until 
enough takers are found.  See INHABER, supra note 92, at 44-45.  
163 In some cases, minimum financial requirements might be applied in an effort to ensure that the new 
owners will be able to adequately discharge their obligations. Yaccino, supra note 135 (reporting that Gary, 
Indiana’s program allowing home purchases for $1 requires “a minimum income threshold (starting at $35,250 for 
one person) and . . . the financial ability to bring the neglected property up to code within six months.”)  The Gary 
program also contains a feature in common with earlier homesteading enactments: owners must live in the 
property for five years before they receive full ownership rights.  See id.; supra note 95. 
164 The term “blotting,” coined by the Brooklyn planning and design firm Interboro comes from the 
contraction of “block lot.”  See David Lepeska, Is Blotting the Best Solution for Shrinking Cities?  ATLANTIC 
CITIES, Nov. 10, 2011; City of Chicago, Adjacent Neighbors Land Acquisition Program (ANLAP), 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/dcd/supp_info/adjacent_neighborslandacquisitionprogramanlap.html ;  
Kate Davidson, Blotting Update: Detroit Wants to Sell You This Lot for $200, Michigan Public Radio, Changing 
Gears, Mar. 13, 2012, http://www.michiganradio.org/post/blotting-update-detroit-wants-sell-you-lot-200 . 
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attempt to capitalize on complementarities that exist between an owners’ 
current holdings and adjacent ones. The obligations of ownership over the 
vacant lot are likely to be self-enforcing (the owner lives next door and will 
personally suffer spillovers from any neglect). As a result, society can glean  
greater net benefits from the ownership arrangement.    
The situations in which repricing is least likely to offer a complete 
solution mirror the situations that justify eminent domain: ones in which 
several complementary changes in ownership are necessary, and failure to 
achieve the full set torpedoes the chance for nearly all of the available social 
gains. In the takings context, offering a payment to a landowner whose 
privately beneficial ownership of a chunk of land stands in the way of a 
valuable highway assembly will not always be enough; holdout problems 
can interfere with the ordinary processes of buying and selling. Similarly, a 
nonowner’s veto power might stand in the way of a desired pattern of 
ownership under certain circumstances, some of which will be explored 
below.165 
 
3. Bonds and Stakes 
 
Ownership’s distinctive social value comes from its capacity to place 
actual outcomes on owners. Full possessory ownership does this in a 
particular way, by automatically imposing those costs or conferring those 
benefits that (literally) come with the territory.  It is an especially suitable 
strategy where it is easier to define and contain the set of relevant outcomes 
by placing physical borders around a resource than it is to enumerate and 
separately contract over the relevant outcomes.166  But, as is well 
recognized, physical boundaries may operate in both overinclusive and 
underinclusive ways in channeling relevant outcomes to the accounts of 
owners.  For this reason, physical possession alone is not sufficient to fully 
align incentives. And, importantly for the present discussion, physical 
possession is not always necessary to address incentive problems, either.   
One facet of this point was made above in observing that taxes, fees, 
and damages can be used to align incentives. However, these monetary 
impositions are often based on expected rather than actual outcomes, for 
reasons that relate to administrability. Yet sometimes it is possible to isolate 
and track actual outcomes as they unfold over time, and to charge those 
actual outcomes to a party without making that party a possessory owner.  
Bonding mechanisms and other required forms of stakeholding can often 
achieve the beneficial effects of  compulsory ownership without actually 
compelling full possessory ownership.   
                                                 
165 See Part IV.B. 
166 This approach corresponds to Smith’s “exclusion strategy.” See text accompanying notes 65-68, supra. 
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Consider laws that mandate the advance posting of bonds. The basic 
idea can be illustrated by bottle deposits: the up-front payment for the bottle 
is designed to cover the social costs of its improper disposal, but that 
payment can be recovered if the bottle is returned.167 The risk of an 
improper disposal is thereby shifted to the bottle’s owner, who holds a put 
option to sell the bottle back in recyclable condition.168  While the bottle 
deposit operates in a binary way—if you return the bottle, you get the full 
deposit back—it is obviously possible to have bonding mechanisms that 
look to some observable indicia of actual outcomes (water quality or air 
quality, for example) to determine how much of a given bond will be 
returned.169   
Nicolaus Tideman has suggested that this approach could be applied to 
abandoned land.170  The fact that it can be costly to restore derelict land to a 
marketable state can explain common law prohibitions on the abandonment 
of fee interests.  It is also the reason that a positive payment might need to 
accompany at least some abandonments.171 But suppose landowners were 
required to pay an amount up front sufficient to cover these costs—
whenever they added structures or other improvements to the land, or 
engaged in uses that might impact the land’s future marketability. Then it 
would be possible for the state to offer a rebate to those who choose to 
voluntarily relinquish their land in good condition (e.g., free of dilapidated 
structures, without latent dangers in the yards and driveways, without 
environmental hazards requiring remediation).172 Even if the property had 
some problems, the associated costs could simply be deducted from the 
rebate, just as damages to a rental unit are deducted from the security 
deposit.   
Bond-posting shifts risk, along with the burden of proof, to the party 
posting the bond.173  In the example just given, the bond could enable a 
                                                 
167The bottle deposit is an intuitive example, but the approach has been generalized. See, e.g., PETER BOHN, 
DEPOSIT-REFUND SYSTEMS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS TO ENVIRONNMENTAL, CONSERVATION, AND 
CONSUMER POLICY (1981); Don Fullerton & Ann Wolverton, Two Generalizations of A Deposit-Refund System, 
NBER Working Paper No. 7505 (2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7505. Robert M. Solow and 
Edwin S. Mills are credited with laying the intellectual foundations for this approach in independent work. See 
Robert M. Solow, The Economist’s Approach to Pollution and Its Control, 173 SCIENCE n.s. 498 (Aug. 6, 1971); 
EDWIN S. MILLS, URBAN ECONOMICS 259-60 (1972).  
168 See Robert Costanza & Charles Perrings, A Flexible Assurance Bonding System for Improved 
Environmental Management, 2 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 57, 59  (1990) . 
169 The bonding idea has even been extended to social policy objectives, with payouts tied to the 
achievement of certain social goals or improvement along particular metrics.  Ronnie Horesh, Injecting Incentives 
Into the Solution of Social Problems: Social Policy Bonds 20(3) ECON. AFFAIRS (2000); [add cites]. 
170 T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization of Spatial Externalities, 
66 LAND ECON. 341, 346 (1990). 
171 Such a payment might be made in kind. See Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 420 (“An owner seeking to 
abandon land should be able to do so upon cleaning up or improving the property sufficiently to give it positive 
market value.”).   
172 These deposits would run with the land, so that expected rebates would get capitalized into negotiated 
resale prices as well.   
173 See Costanza & Perrings, supra note 168, at 65. 
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clean exit from a possessory ownership relationship.  Bonds could also 
stand in for possessory ownership.  A party who is thought to occupy an 
especially good position to bear some risk or influence some result (but who 
does not need to be in physical possession of a particular piece of property 
to do so) could be required to post a bond that will be returned in whole or 
in part depending on actual outcomes.  Thus, instead of requiring a new 
factory to buy up the properties of the surrounding homeowners, the factory 
owner might merely be required to post a bond that would be sufficient to 
cover the “worst case scenario” effects of its noise, effluents, and vibrations.  
This bond, or a portion of it, could be returned after a period of years based 
on objective measures of these impacts, or of their derived impacts on home 
values. 
Posting a bond is one way of linking one’s own payoffs to future states 
of the world, and thereby bearing risk and accepting responsibility.  The 
idea can be broadened to all forms of “taking a stake” in a particular 
property interest, enterprise, or outcome.  While owners of possessory 
interests are obviously stakeholders, it is possible to hold a stake without 
being in physical possession.174 Where achieving a social goal depends on 
the incentive and risk allocations associated with financial stakes, but where 
the incentives in question can operate without being in physical possession, 
mandatory stakeholding can be an alternative to full-strength forced 
ownership.   
Although the idea of forced stakeholding sounds unusual, there are 
some antecedents. As private contracting behavior demonstrates, sometimes 
property holdings can serve a “hostage” role in channeling  behavior.175 A 
recent example is Apple’s announcement that CEO Tim Cook will be 
required to hold ten times his base salary in shares.176 If a person or entity is 
thought to be especially well-positioned to determine whether an enterprise 
succeeds or fails, a required stake in the enterprise might be expected to 
powerfully harness incentives.  
The model could, in theory, be extended to governmental impositions of 
ownership stakes, as a recent proposal by Gideon Parchomovsky and Endre 
Stavang illustrates.177 Because stakeholding can be extended to parties 
beyond those in physical possession, it offers a flexible alternative to co-
                                                 
174 By the same token, the person who is in physical possession may not be the best person to bear certain 
risks associated with the property.   
175 See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 
AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983).    
176Adam Satariano, Apple Requires CEO Cook to Hold 10 Times Salary in Stock, Bloomberg.com, Mar. 1, 
2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-01/apple-requires-ceo-cook-to-hold-10-times-salary-in-
stock.html.  Other senior executive officers are required to own shares equal to three times their base salary. Id. 
177 Gideon Parchomovsky & Endre Stavang, Environmental Options (working paper, ALEA 2013) 
(presenting a proposal in which a firm might be required to purchase futures in a “green” enterprise).  Although 
the authors call the interest that the business is required to buy an “option,” it is better described as a future 
because the business is forced to exercise it “even at a loss.”   
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ownership for parties whose holdings mutually spill over onto each other’s.  
Indeed, the semicommons arrangement in medieval common fields can be 
understood as a blunt-force way of compelling owners of farming strips to 
take a stake in the fate of the field as a whole, and not just a segregable 
corner of it.  The possibility of extending this concept to communities and 
neighborhoods has received some scholarly attention.178      
Taking a stake in an outcome means effectively placing a bet on it, 
which can in turn harness parties’ ability to influence the outcome of that 
bet.  Allowing multiple parties to take stakes in a single outcome opens up 
the possibility of elegant solutions to otherwise intractable incentive 
dilemmas.179 When more than one party can influence a given outcome, 
assigning the upside or downside risk to only one of them will weaken the 
incentives to the others.  Various ways of splitting up gains and losses are 
possible, but each comes with drawbacks.  Mechanisms that allow each 
party to bear the full risk associated with her inputs can help to align 
incentives.180 
Of course, the fact that certain arrangements help to align incentives 
does not necessarily make out a case for mandating them.  Parties might be 
expected to opt into beneficial stakeholding arrangements. But there are at 
least two reasons why it might be helpful to keep the idea of mandatory 
stakeholding on the slate of possible alternatives.  
First, temporarily mandated (or even just subsidized) stakeholding could 
help to generate an initial critical mass to support the development of 
voluntary stake-taking markets. Consider, for example, the idea of having 
local residents buy shares in new developments.  This “crowdfunding” idea 
has been floated as an antidote to NIMBYism.181  If all homeowners in a 
particular residential area were automatically endowed with a small stake in 
the neighboring commercial district, we might expect collective action in 
support of optimal development to take hold in a way that might not be 
possible if households could selectively opt in or out.182   
                                                 
178 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 174-
75 (2010) (sketching a model in which neighboring jurisdictions would be required to buy a certain number of 
securities indexed to each other’s local property values). 
179 See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (2002); [Robert Cooter & 
Ariel Porat, Total Liability for Excessive Harm, J. LEGAL STUD. (2006)].  The theoretical underpinnings of this 
move can be found in Robert Cooter’s idea of “double responsibility at the margin.”  Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, 
Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1985); see also Coase, supra note 
211, at 41 (proposing a “double tax system” for both sides of a land use conflict). 
180 See, e.g., sources cited in note 179, supra. This idea underlies, for example, some proposals to decouple 
the award of tort damages to plaintiffs from the amount of damages collected from defendants. Care must be taken 
in structuring these arrangements to avoid creating other distortions, however.  See  Nuno Garoupa & Chris 
William Sanchirico, Decoupling as Transactions Tax, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 469, 469–72 (2010) (observing that 
legal rules structured to incentive both plaintiffs and defendants through decoupling may operate as a tax on the 
transaction as a whole by reducing its joint payoff. 
181 See Matthew Yglesias, The Real Estate Crowdfunding Scheme That Could Revolutionize Urban Policy by 
Defeating NIMBYism, SLATE, June 5, 2013.   
182 Similarly, tenants in gentrifying areas might be required to hold securities that are indexed to property 
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Second, stakeholding is a less intrusive alternative that might be 
considered in contexts where forced ownership is currently used or 
contemplated.  When considered in conjunction with the other alternatives 
to forced ownership discussed above, the possibility of stakeholding further 
refines and limits the conditions in which an outright forcing would 
dominate.  Rather than viewing these mechanisms as falling completely 
outside of the domain of forcings, however, it may be more useful to see 
them as specialized instantiations of it, where the ownership interest in 
question is narrowly defined to comprise a certain set of outcomes.183        
 
B.  Compensated Forcings 
 
Compensated forced ownership offers an interesting conceptual analog 
to eminent domain, even if its domain is limited in some of the ways 
already suggested. This section will consider how a doctrine of 
compensated forcings might be developed, noting places where it might 
have operative traction.   
 
1. Forcings for Public Use 
 
Consider the possibility that forcings could serve a policy function 
analogous to (if more limited than) eminent domain. Just as eminent domain 
represents a call option held by the government, a forcing represents a put 
option that is held by the government.  We might initially wonder why 
resort to such an option would ever be necessary, given the potential to 
reprice ownership or to identify willing owners through an auction process. 
Unlike potential sellers, who may hold a spatial monopoly on a sought-after 
parcel, potential buyers (or, potential accepters of property) are rarely in a 
similarly unique position.184 They can compete against each other even 
when the interest in question carries negative value, as airline passengers do 
in the context of oversold flights.185  
In some cases, though, parties are locked in bilateral monopolies with 
each other that grant monopoly power to potential buyers as well as 
                                                                                                                            
values—another stake-realigning move that could reduce resistance to certain kinds of community changes.  See  
BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, CITY ECONOMICS 369 (2005) (“Tenants could get a long-run stake in the community if 
they were required to buy some variety of security that was pegged to the town’s or neighborhood’s total property 
value.”); see also Robert I. Lerman and Signe-Mary McKernan, Promoting Neighborhood Improvement while 
Protecting Low-Income Families *2–3 (Urban Institute Opportunity and Ownership Project No 8, May 2007), 
online at http://www.urban.org/publications/311457.html; Fennell & Roin, supra note 193, at 165-71. 
183 Bonding and staking, like the other alternatives to ownership discussed here (and like other governmental 
actions regarding property) might impose burdens significant enough to trigger compensation requirements.   
184 See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE 
L.J. 2091, 2093-94 (1997). 
185 See INHABER, supra note 92, at 44-45.  The system works because there is no realistic ability for the 
passengers to collude to drive up the price, and no particular individual who must be specifically coerced to skip 
the flight.   
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potential sellers.186  Encroachment and accession cases offer simple 
examples where restoring unified ownership in complementary goods 
requires either a purchase or a sale between two specified parties.  To take 
another example, the government might wish to produce a particular spatial 
pattern of land ownership that packages together complementarities or that 
disperses ownership among existing landholders in specified ways.  Just as 
voluntary purchases may not always produce the aggregated patterns of 
land necessary for certain public projects, so too may subsidies fail to do so. 
To see the niche that a forcings approach might fill, it is first helpful to 
step back and consider why eminent domain is valuable to society.  It is not 
just that some uses, such as highways and urban redevelopment, require the 
aggregation of land. It is that they also require the consolidation of 
ownership.187 But why? Lloyd Cohen provocatively explores this question 
in his analysis of holdouts.188 He posits that if there were no transaction 
costs, holdouts would not be a problem because they could simply retain 
separate ownership.  The would-be holdout could continue to own, say, an 
area within the footprint of a newly developed department store, which he 
could seamlessly operate as part of the store.189 
Given the costs of coordination and monitoring, however, the idea 
breaks down—owners of store fragments could harm each other and benefit 
themselves with impunity.190 The corner holdout might steal merchandise 
from, or toss garbage into, the other portion of the store, or he might simply 
invest too little in improving the store’s reputation, given that he will reap 
only a fraction of the benefits.  These are, of course, standard “tragedy of 
the commons” arguments against dividing or sharing ownership in certain 
ways.191 The key point is that the allocation of ownership itself matters, 
given the costs of delivering access to resources.    
Perhaps the most likely scenario for a forcing would be in cases of 
complementarities between an owner’s current properties and related or 
adjacent properties that she does not yet own.  In some instances, a forcing 
could be presented to the owner as an alternative to eminent domain.  
Suppose, for example, that our department store holdout were given a 
choice between having his property condemned through eminent domain 
and receiving fair market value (FMV) for it, or buying out the developer’s 
land holdings instead by paying FMV for those properties.192 A landowner 
                                                 
186 See AYRES, supra note 5, at 19-20. 
187 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1015 (2008) (viewing “number of owners” as a central dimension in property, along with asset size and 
configuration). 
188 Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1991). 
189 Id. at 353.  The inducement to operate the corner as part of the larger store would come from the fact that 
this is its most profitable use.   
190 See id. at 354. 
191 Not all common ownership schemes end in tragedy, of course. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 113. 
192 This model shares some ground with certain techniques for dividing property held in common, such as 
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who placed a high value on retaining possession of his portion of the 
property could elect the purchase option. Presumably, the opportunity cost 
of the large consolidated holding would prompt an owner to employ the 
property in what society might regard as its highest and best use, but if he 
did not, he would at least bear the associated cost.193  
Purchases might also be compelled where eminent domain is not in 
play.  For example, in a case of purely private development, the government 
might wish to place more property under one owner’s control than would be 
independently selected by the developer, perhaps to generate positive 
externalities for the surrounding area.  Similarly, a local government might 
address the concerns of the surrounding community by allowing residents 
or businesses to force purchases of their properties on developers who 
would transform an area in ways that would make them wish to leave.  
Again, these ideas would be most plausible in instances where there is a 
particular owner, who because of her other holdings (or proposed other 
holdings), is especially well positioned to also own the properties in 
question.194 
Contrast with this model the idea of turning ownership of unwanted 
parcels into a randomly imposed civic burden, like the military draft or jury 
duty.195  To make such an idea minimally workable, it would be necessary 
to carefully define the eligible pool and place restrictions on 
reconveyance.196 However, a lottery among subsidized (and pre-screened) 
volunteers or an auction designed to find the eligible person who will accept 
                                                                                                                            
the “Texas Shootout” approach to partnership dissolution. See, e.g., Richard W. Brooks, Claudia M. Landeo, & 
Kathryn E. Spier, Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts, 41 
Rand J. Econ. 649 (2010); Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. 
REV. 771, 838-43 (1982).  In that model, one party makes a valuation and the other party can choose to either buy 
out or be bought out at that price. Another analogy is found in the entitlement literature in which parties receive 
pairs of choices, such as receiving damages or shutting down an offending use.  See Ronen Avraham, Modular 
Liability Rules, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 269 (2004); Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and 
Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rights, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
193 Complementarities could also justify a different sort of forced purchase arrangement in the eminent 
domain context.  When the government acquires property through eminent domain, the purchase does not appear 
as a “forced” one from the government’s perspective--the government is free to purchase or not purchase the 
property, and to decide what to purchase.  However, sensitivity to complementarities that may be disrupted by 
condemnation might argue at times for putting the government to a choice between condemning nothing and 
condemning a larger chunk than it might otherwise prefer (and compensating for it).  Abraham Bell and Gideon 
Parchomovsky hint at this idea in discussing the possibility that eminent domain might at times take too little 
property rather than too much  See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three 
Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1064-65 (2008).  In one application of this idea, a takee (or set of takees) 
from whom the government proposes to take just a small slice might receive a put option that would enable her to 
force a sale to the government of the full parcel at its fair market value. 
194 Cf. Merrill, supra note 17, at 488-91  (describing accession as a way of identifying a fit owner).  
195 On the use of randomization strategies to allocate goods and bads, see JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC 
JUDGEMENTS,  53-78 (1989). 
196 For example, perhaps only residents within a certain radius of the subject property would be included. 
Screens based on income and credit history (or willingness to post a bond) could be applied to ensure that the 
person would be in a position to bear the obligations of ownership, and hardship exemptions would be available to 
those who lacked sufficient time or liquidity to manage the property. Restrictions on reconveyance would be 
necessary to ensure that the goals of the program would not be undone through reconveyance to, say, a judgment-
proof individual.      
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the property at the lowest negative price would likely be more attractive 
alternatives. Unless there is some civic value generated by the random 
assignment itself, or the random assignment is simply much cheaper to 
operate,197 mechanisms that make the transfer voluntary appear preferable. 
Consistent with takings doctrine, not all forced purchases would require 
compensation,198 nor would compensation necessarily have to be in cash.199  
The next section considers how tests used to assess burdens in the takings 
context might be adapted to forcings, and section 3 turns to questions of 
compensation.      
 
2. Regulatory (and Judicial) Forcings  
 
Forced ownership tends to be most plausible in settings where the owner 
has already voluntarily undertaken ownership (or some other possessory 
action) with regard to a connected or complementary interest. This is 
because coercion will only dominate other alternatives (such as an auction) 
where there is a form of monopoly leverage in play, and  the typical source 
of that leverage will be a party’s  existing holdings or possessory interests.  
The question then becomes whether requiring  ownership of this additional 
interest is a type of burden for which compensation is due, or whether it 
should be understood as a normatively appropriate adjunct to the voluntary 
ownership interest.   
Evaluating the burdens associated with forced ownership raises 
questions that are familiar from regulatory takings doctrine, though not  
easily resolved.  What kinds of background conditions are (or should be) 
understood to inherently condition title? How much should it matter if one 
had notice of an unwanted restriction before one acted or invested?200 How 
much of a diminution in value must be borne without payment?  When is an 
owner being required to confer benefits on society, the costs of which 
should be spread more broadly?  All of the difficulties and unanswered 
questions that plague takings law find counterparts in forcings analysis.  For 
example, the possibility that courts as well as the political branches can 
engage in takings raises the question of whether a corresponding doctrine of 
                                                 
197 One reason it could be cheaper to operate relates to adverse selection.  People who take on ownership 
burdens for pay may be willing to do so for less money because they know they have a greater capacity to dodge 
the obligations of ownership.  This puts more pressure on the screening mechanisms than in a purely volunteer or 
randomized system.   
198 The question of which governmental interferences with property require compensation has been the 
subject of extensive analysis and numerous doctrinal wrinkles.  For a classic and influential treatment, see Frank I. 
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 
80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). 
199 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 195-215 (1986) (discussing “implicit in-kind compensation”); id. at 
195 (“The Constitution speaks only of ‘just’ compensation, not of the form it must take.”).   
200 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (examining the effect of a change of ownership on a 
takings claim).   
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judicial forcings should be developed.   
Recognizing these commonalities might suggest that forcings can be 
comfortably folded into existing takings law.  To some extent this is true.  
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the takings clause is probably the 
right place to locate the analysis of burdens associated with property 
ownership—including the burden of additional or prolonged property 
ownership. The analysis becomes trickier when the precondition for 
unwanted ownership is not another form of ownership, but rather some 
other activity, such as tortious conduct.  In a broad sense, we might say that 
the takings clause is meant as a countermajoritarian check against 
burdensome governmental interferences with one’s chosen property 
arrangements, whether those arrangements involve ownership or 
nonownership.  
Importantly, however, the takings clause presupposes legitimate action 
that requires for its validation only the payment of just compensation—a 
liability rule.  The due process clause and other constitutional provisions 
stand guard against illegitimate government conduct that cannot be 
validated through payment. To the extent that forcings interfere with liberty 
interests or violate other constitutional provisions, they could not be 
legitimated through the payment of compensation. The idea of compensated 
forcings presupposes, however, that there are some forms of forced 
ownership that are legitimate if (and only if) they are compensated. The 
idea makes intuitive sense: the normative justifications for imposing 
ownership cannot always be expected to line up with situations in which the 
distributive consequences of forced ownership are justified.  But as a 
doctrinal matter, there is room for debate about the extent, and even the 
existence, of a zone in which forcings are both permissible and 
compensable. 
In deciding whether a permissible forcing requires compensation, the 
correct normative analysis would have much in common with takings 
analysis insofar as it involves a search for baselines, an analysis of 
deviations from those baselines, and consideration of the extent to which 
investment-backed expectations have been undermined.  When is ownership 
itself the sort of burden, or surprise, or burdensome surprise that makes its 
uncompensated imposition normatively problematic? These inquiries 
always threaten to turn circular in the takings context, and the same is true 
when it comes to forcings.   
 
3. Compensation 
 
If just compensation were required for a forcing, what would it look 
like?  Here, as with eminent domain, FMV would presumably be the 
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constitutional touchstone. When ownership carries positive value, a forced 
governmental purchase (the government’s exercise of a put option) would 
typically involve the government collecting money, not paying it out.  Of 
course, it is entirely possible for property to carry a negative FMV.  
Depending on the obligations that go with the ownership interest in 
question, then, the strike price for the governmental exercise of a put option 
might be either positive or negative.201 Typically, though, at least some of 
the compensation due would be provided in kind through the ownership 
interest itself.   
Eminent domain is controversial in significant part because of factors 
for which the government’s just compensation measure does not adequately 
compensate.202 Mirror-image concerns arise in the case of forcings.  First, 
there is the question of how and whether subjective valuations should play 
into compensation. In place of the positive subjective premium typically 
attributed to existing owners, there is a presumptive subjective deficit 
associated with forced ownership.  Just as we can assume most condemnees 
have valuations above FMV (given that they have not already sold), we can 
assume that most forced purchasers have valuations below FMV (given that 
they have not already bought).   
Second, whereas condemnees are deprived of opportunities to realize 
gains from trade (or other above-expected-value returns), forced purchasers 
are made to bear the chance of losses to the extent ownership assigns them 
actual outcomes.203  Thus takings swap an expected value (derived through 
FMV) for an actual outcome, while forcings do the opposite. If people are 
thought to be risk averse, then there could be an asymmetry between the 
two situations. While just compensation (as currently constitutionally 
defined) does not give condemnees anything for giving up a chance at a 
larger-than-average gain from trade (nor charge them anything for relieving 
them of worse-than-expected results), it is an open question whether a 
forcing should require some compensation for taking on the risks of 
ownership, beyond the expected value that those risks present.     
Third, as already noted, there is an autonomy or dignitary interest that is 
implicated to the extent that ownership affects one’s self-definition.204  This 
consideration is the trickiest to address, here as in the case of eminent 
domain, because it is not truly amenable to monetary compensation. In the 
                                                 
201 A negative strike price would mean that the holder of the option (here, the government) could force 
ownership on an individual, but would have to pay the individual.  Viewed from another angle, we might say that 
the government in this scenario holds a call option that enables it to pay a positive price to engage in an activity 
that imposes costs: the offloading of ownership.  Nothing turns on which term is used.  Because puts usually 
involve forcing ownership onto another party, I have used that terminology here.   
202 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 1077 (suggesting that the measure of compensation 
provides at least a partial explanation for why property owners are concerned about the definition of “public use”).  
203 It is also true that condemnees may be saved from experiencing actual losses, and that forced purchasers 
may experience actual gains.  The focus in the text is on the aversive side of the compelled change in ownership. 
204 See text accompanying notes 57-61, supra.   
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forcings context, autonomy concerns might be addressed either by allowing 
an escape hatch,205 or by limiting the uses of forcings to contexts where 
autonomy concerns are unlikely to be implicated. Here, it would be fruitful 
to consider differences with respect to autonomy among types of owners 
and types of property.  Corporate owners might have fewer autonomy 
concerns than individuals, and fungible property interests might present 
fewer autonomy concerns than properties of a more personal nature.206  
 
C.  Uncompensated Forcings 
 
Existing examples of involuntary ownership, such as trover and 
accession, tend to be uncompensated.  The implicit assumption behind these 
remedies is that they represent normatively appropriate burdens associated 
with earlier acts. As already emphasized, burdens can be assessed without 
resorting to burdens that take the form of ownership.  The interesting 
question is whether existing forms of uncompensated forced ownership 
represent all of the instances, or only those instances, in which putting a 
normatively justified burden into the form of mandatory ownership would 
best serve social goals.   
 
1. Owning Consequence Zones 
 
Scholars have already examined how put options might be used in place 
of other nuisance remedies.207  However, the analysis has typically focused 
on the question of being forced to buy an entitlement to, say, emit effluents 
at the price of the expected damage that is caused.  The goal of this 
literature has been to devise ways to get “the entitlement” to the highest 
valuer.  The implicit assumption is that this task can be completed once and 
for all time by carving out and allocating the specific land use right that is in 
dispute.  A different model would involve the compulsory purchase of the 
affected property itself. For instance, residents who are bothered by a 
nearby factory might have the option to force the sale of their fee simple 
interests to the factory, not just the sale of the right to emit pollutants.208    
Under certain circumstances, forcing the sale of the fee interest might 
offer advantages over the more well-studied model of forcing the sale of 
                                                 
205 See infra Part IV.D. (discussing the use of relievings as an escape hatch).   
206 Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). Thanks to Eduardo 
Peñalver for comments on this point.   
207 See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 5. 
208 Permanent damages awarded in nuisance effectively place a servitude on the affected land.  See Boomer 
v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970).  A plaintiff that is entitled to elect permanent damages 
could thereby force the party causing the nuisance to purchase the servitude. But see Epstein, supra note 17 at 843 
(observing that a defendant cannot be forced to continue polluting, and suggesting that only temporary damages 
could be imposed on a defendant who elected to shut down instead).   
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just the entitlement to emit.  In cases where there is sharp disagreement 
about the actual impacts that will be realized over time, a transfer of 
ownership may offer both parties a more acceptable solution than would 
permanent damages based on an expected value.209 Second, putting 
ownership into the same hands avoids the kinds of incentive problems going 
forward that have been raised in the permanent damages context.210  A 
polluter who has already paid permanent damages may not innovate to 
reduce harm even when it could be done cost-effectively, but a polluter who 
owns the land that will be polluted would retain that incentive.211  The 
solution is also better incentive-wise than a series of damage judgments 
over time that would reflect realized harm, at least to the extent that the 
victims in the story could influence the impacts that they will suffer.  A 
single owner will pursue whichever alternative offers the highest payoff, 
whether taking precautions on the adjacent land, adding scrubbers to the 
factory, or doing nothing at all. 
A single-owner approach also differs from the “risk ownership” idea 
propounded by Ripstein. Rather than metaphorically owning the 
consequences of one’s acts within normatively constructed conceptual and 
causal bounds, one would actually own “consequence zones”—physical 
places where certain kinds of impacts are likely to be realized.  
Consequence zone ownership need not be imposed only on the party 
that desires the more active or invasive use.  It would also be possible to 
make the party with a complaint about a neighbor’s use buy up that 
neighbor’s property.  New Jersey’s conditional variances, in which stopping 
the grant of a variance means purchasing the property in question, does 
something very much like this.212  Following the Coasean idea of reciprocal 
harm,213 we can understand the objecting neighbor as being required to 
absorb the negative impact that her demands have on the value of the 
nearby property—the opportunity cost of keeping the land in its current use.     
If forced purchases sound like extreme overkill in managing spillovers 
and a radical departure from current practices, consider the fact that we 
                                                 
209 While it might seem that one party is bound to be wrong, the ability of parties to influence outcomes can 
turn the game into a positive sum one.  Another approach to uncertainty about impacts is to use a bonding 
mechanism, as discussed above.  See supra Part IV.A.3. 
210 See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at  876 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (“[O]nce such permanent damages are assessed 
and paid, the incentive to alleviate the wrong would be eliminated, thereby continuing air pollution of an area 
without abatement.”). 
211 As with all other inefficiencies, the shortfall in past-payment innovation is the product of positive 
transaction costs.  See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960).  If the residents could 
costlessly bargain with the factory to invent a better pollution-stopper, this would occur.  But of course if the 
residents could costlessly bargain with the factory, there would have been no need for a lawsuit and an award of 
permanent damages in the first place.  Ownership is not the only way to address this problem, however.  A 
bonding mechanism that granted refunds based on actual results is another alternative, as discussed below.   
212 Ownership is not actually forced on the neighbor under New Jersey’s conditional variance model; rather, 
her ability to defeat the variance depends on her willingness to buy the property.  See note 20, supra and 
accompanying text.  
213 See Coase, supra note 211, at 2. 
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already do something very similar through zoning. People are not allowed 
to acquire and use property interests of any size and shape whatever.  While 
concerns about later reconfiguration costs represent one rationale, a more 
basic one is that too-small holdings produce a profusion of boundary lines, 
and hence more spillovers that must be managed at positive cost.  Indeed, 
Peter Colwell observed that governmentally imposed land use restrictions 
could be jettisoned altogether if holdings were required to be large enough 
(he gives the example of 640 acres) and edges were subject to certain 
requirements (such as “very tall berms”).214   
There are countervailing considerations, of course. As Yoram Barzel 
has observed, there are disadvantages of consolidating ownership in one 
person or entity, including scale mismatches between labor and non-labor 
inputs and specialization losses.215  Yet zoning operates prophylactically to 
mandate minimum bundles for all (even if they are orders of magnitude 
smaller than Colwell’s thought experiment). Because forcings could operate 
more selectively where spillovers have actually shown themselves to be 
troublesome, they would not necessarily increase average parcel size, and 
could indeed diminish the incidence of unwanted ownership of excess land.   
 
2. Addressing Territoriality 
  
A forcings model might also be used to require ownership of bundles 
that correspond to observed patterns of behavior, including territorial 
behaviors. Consider the concerns that have been raised about “curb 
territoriality”:  the phenomenon of homeowners claiming exclusive rights in 
the street parking spots that their homes front upon.  A particularly intense 
(albeit episodic) subspecies of the problem is found in the “dibs barriers” 
that Chicagoans use to mark claims over spaces that they have dug out of 
the snow.216  In both cases, the concern is the same: asserting exclusive 
private ownership over public parking spaces impedes the efficient rotation 
of cars in and out of spaces over the course of a day or week. One 
prescription is to deny private claims over the spaces to ensure that they 
remain in the commons.   
The analysis here suggests another alternative that builds on rather than 
fights owners’ territorial impulses. The adjacent landowners could be 
required to purchase rights to the parking spaces that front their homes or 
businesses, and then be allowed to market those rights in exchange for 
                                                 
214 Peter F. Colwell, Tender Mercies: Efficient and Equitable Land Use Change, 25 REAL ESTATE ECON. 
525, 529 n.6 (1997). 
215 BARZEL, supra note 69, at 51-52 (2d ed. 1997).   
216 This practice has received significant scholarly attention.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Allocation of the 
Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S515, S528-33 (2002). 
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micropayments from parkers.217  Such exchanges may soon become feasible 
at low cost due to the ubiquity of smart phones that could be equipped with 
parking apps. We might also expect services to emerge to handle the 
transactions on behalf of owners.  If it becomes possible for would-be 
parkers to quickly learn about available spaces and pay to occupy them, the 
landowners would be confronted with the opportunity cost of keeping 
spaces out of circulation. While some might choose to bear the expense, 
most presumably would not.   
The question remains whether such an ownership obligation could or 
should be imposed without compensation. One possibility would be to link 
the purchase requirement to acts of possessory behavior toward the parking 
spaces, such as attempting to reserve them even when empty.  This would 
be a variation on the “you break, you buy” approach.  It would also seem 
relatively uncontroversial to apply a mandatory purchase requirement in the 
case of new development; it would be no different from requiring that a 
business make adequate provision for parking.   
 
3. Rethinking Existing Uncompensated Forcings 
 
So far I have focused on possible extensions of uncompensated forcings.  
But it is also possible that some existing uncompensated forcings are not 
really justified.  As noted, burdens can be imposed in a form other than 
ownership if ownership itself does not produce advantages. I have  focused 
primarily on the ability of ownership to deliver outcomes going forward. 
However, sometimes the advantages that ownership produces are not of this 
nature; they instead involve economizing on information costs about past 
and present events, including decision costs about the allocation of 
ownership itself.   
Consider again the remedies of accession and trover.   Here, the reason 
for assigning ownership may simply be to save society the costs of figuring 
out damages.  Yet it is quite possible that society could readily put a figure 
to the costs of calculating damages.  An actor who is willing to bear those 
calculation costs (as well as the costs of the damages themselves, once 
calculated) could be relieved of ownership without imposing any costs on 
society as a whole.  Similarly, abandonment may be primarily socially 
costly because it creates confusion or involves the offloading of land  that 
has already been damaged in some way.  If these costs could be covered, as 
                                                 
217 If individual ownership of parking rights proved too difficult to implement, collective ownership of the 
parking rights by a group of adjacent residents is another possible approach.  Cf. GEORGE W. LIEBMANN, THE 
LITTLE PLATOONS: SUB-LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN MODERN HISTORY 58-59 (1995) (describing an approach used 
in St. Louis County in which “title to the bed of a street is deeded to the residents adjacent to it, subject to 
assessments enforceable by a lien,” with the streets then managed by an association of the owners).  This approach 
is similar in spirit to unitization, and similarly might be enabled to proceed on less than unanimous agreement. See 
id. (noting that legislation has allowed street privatization in St. Louis upon petition by 95% of the residents).   
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through a bonding mechanism, ending ownership would not inflict social 
costs.  These observations suggest the utility of the converse of forcings, 
relievings.   
 
D.  Relievings 
 
Most of the discussion in this paper has focused on the situation in 
which ownership is socially valuable but privately burdensome.  Yet many 
situations in which ownership is compelled actually involve social as well 
as private costs.  Offering a way out of ownership holds social value to the 
extent it relieves those who are ill-suited to bear the associated risks or 
make the necessary decisions. If ending ownership would be a Pareto 
improvement, why does it not happen?  To observe that there is currently no 
established mechanism through which unwilling owners can be readily 
relieved of ownership only begs the question. 
The law does at times exhibit a sensitivity to the costs of ownership and 
the realities of being forced to continue bearing its burdens. For example, In 
re Pratt, a First Circuit case, involved a GMAC-financed Chevy Cavalier 
that GMAC refused to repossess after a debtor in bankruptcy surrendered 
it.218 No junkyard would accept the now-worthless car without a lien release 
from GMAC, but GMAC would not release the lien. The owners, the court 
found, “were confronted with the grim prospect of retaining indefinite 
possession of a worthless vehicle unless they paid the GMAC loan balance, 
together with all the attendant costs of possessing, maintaining, insuring, 
and/or garaging the vehicle.” It held that GMAC’s actions, even if permitted 
under state law, were “coercive” in effect and thus in contravention of the 
discharge injunction under bankruptcy law.219  
 What the court did in Pratt amounted to a relieving, though it was not 
given that name.  But relievings are relatively uncommon.  Why?  Clearly 
there are costs associated with providing relief from ownership. Not only 
may it be costly to administer a system that delivers such relief, the end 
result may be ownership that the government does not want, or the costs 
associated with inducing (or forcing) another party to take up ownership.   
But suppose some relievings would produce net gains, despite their costs. 
The problem may be that it is deemed normatively inappropriate for society 
to bear the costs associated with the relieving—both the costs of 
administering the system, and the costs that ending ownership will impose, 
including heightened information costs, the costs of retransferring the 
property, and so on.   
This is where the idea of chargeable relievings comes in.  Just as there 
                                                 
218 462 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2006). 
219 Id. at 20. 
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may be cases where the social value of ownership does not line up with the 
distributive fairness of imposing ownership’s burdens, there may be cases 
where the social costs of ending ownership do not line up with the 
distributive fairness of relieving the owner of the related burdens.  
Compensated forcings on the one hand and chargeable relievings on the 
other can accommodate these misalignments. On reflection, the idea of a 
chargeable relieving is not odd at all.  Relievings amount to put options 
against the government; decisions about the charges that will accompany 
them simply amount to selecting the strike price.  
Put options against the government have been offered in relatively 
limited situations, such as the buyback of guns,220 gas guzzling 
“clunkers,”221 and fishing boats.222  But they might be offered more 
broadly.223 As already suggested, an especially promising application would 
be in enabling would-be abandoners to rid themselves of their property in 
an orderly manner by paying the costs that their termination of ownership 
imposes.224  Similarly, a tortfeasor subject to trover could be allowed to 
avoid forced ownership by paying the costs of appraising the damage. Such 
an approach would allow a party to transform her position from outcome-
bearer to damage-payer. Thus, relievings can often constitute a 
complementary strategy to—or an escape hatch from—forcings.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Government coercion can be used to impose or prolong private 
ownership, just as it can be used to cut it short.  Yet forcings as a form of 
government compulsion has not received a systematic exploration, despite 
its evident connection to existing bodies of literature.  One might contend 
that this neglect is appropriate because the real-world domain of forcings is 
likely to be limited or nonexistent for normative or practical reasons.  But 
that claim cannot be evaluated until we recognize the category itself.  Doing 
so directs attention to existing forms of forced or pressured ownership, and 
prompts exploration of the reasons behind them and the limits on them.   
Recognizing a category of forcings focuses new attention on how 
ownership, as a mechanism for assigning actual rather than expected 
outcomes, can hold social value even when it proves privately burdensome. 
                                                 
220 See Morris, supra note 5, 854-55 (discussing gun buybacks as examples of put options) 
221 See Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, The Effects of Fiscal Stimulus: Evidence from the 2009 “Cash for 
Clunkers” Program (September 2010) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670759 (studying the impact of the summer 2009 
“Cash for Clunkers” program that enabled U.S. motorists to turn in fuel-inefficient cars for destruction in 
exchange for a credit against certain new vehicle purchases). 
222 See, e.g., L.S. PARSONS, MANAGEMENT OF MARINE FISHERIES IN CANADA 191 (1993) (discussing fishing 
license buyback programs). 
223 See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 140,at 1457-59 (discussing the use of put options in conjunction with 
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The ability to save on information costs, to allocate risk, and to align 
incentives may motivate choices to compel ownership over the objections 
of the owner herself.  Of course, forced ownership will rarely be the best 
answer; there are typically other alternatives that can serve the relevant 
social purposes at lower cost. Yet isolating the conditions that could call for 
the imposition of ownership shows not only how forcings might be 
extended but also where existing forms of involuntary ownership might be 
replaced with less coercive alternatives. Finding the niche that forcings 
occupy on the slate of policy alternatives also illuminates another 
unappreciated domain for governmental action—that of relieving owners of 
burdensome ownership.   
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